Beyond Politics: Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo united in complexity

Omar Memišević 

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo share a common history of almost six centuries long. From the Ottoman era and the 1831 Battle of Kosovo, where the forces of Bosnian rebels defeated Ottoman loyalists to the Yugoslav era, this joint history is indeed dynamic. It has featured many challenges between the two countries. However, a look at 2024, the relations are no less dynamic or challenging.

In the Western Balkan regional context, Kosovo and BiH are seen as the two countries with the most challenges, especially internal relations and external challenges related to regional cooperation. In this sense, it would make sense that BiH and Kosovo, given the common challenges, pursue a policy of closer relations aimed at increasing security, and economic, and political cooperation. However, it’s because of the following reasons that the countries are not
doing so.

„In the Western Balkan regional context, Kosovo and BiH are seen as the two countries with the most challenges, especially internal relations and external challenges related to regional cooperation.“

Photo: Shutterstock. com

Political Challenges

The main challenge for the relations between the two countries is of a political nature observed in the fact that BiH does not recognise the independence of Kosovo. This is largely because of the policy of the Republika Srpska (RS) political leadership, personalised by Milorad Dodik, the President of RS, and Željka Cvijanović, a member of the BiH Presidency. Their public statements so far have been that BiH should follow Serbia’s lead when it comes to Kosovo, a policy that has so far permeated the national decision-making mechanisms of BiH due to the policy from the RS representatives.

In practice, this means that BiH has never recognised Kosovo and, as of 2024, has failed to ratify a set of agreements related to freedom of movement. The agreement in question was accepted in spirit by some RS officials in 2022 but was vetoed by the RS National Assembly, as well as the Council of Ministers of BiH as the top executive branch of the Government of BiH, where agreements were de facto vetoed as all the state ministers coming from RS voted against. In essence, Bosnia and Herzegovina nationals travelling to Kosovo need to apply for a visa in Zagreb, Podgorica, or Skopje. On the other hand, Kosovo nationals can enter BiH with official documents of Kosovo but have to have a special visa issued by BiH Embassies in Belgrade, Skopje, or Podgorica. This approach was criticised by the Albanian associations in BiH, but no revision of the policy is in sight so far. This will likely not change unless there is some concrete positive development in the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue.

When raising the topic of Kosovo, the main concern within the BiH political discourse is whether or not the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue can be reflected upon BiH in any case, with the number one concern being the future of RS. 

Since the signing of the Brussels agreement in 2013, which obliged Kosovo to create a Community of Serb Municipalities in those communities where Kosovo Serbs constitute a majority. The community, whose creation is still being debated in Kosovo, is designed to be a self-governing entity within the Republic of Kosovo, which ensures the rights and freedoms of local Serbs in the country. In the immediate aftermath of the Brussels Agreement, opposition to the agreement mounted in Kosovo, with the opposition to the agreement being based on the fact that this Community of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo looks a lot like Republika Srpska in BiH. Given the situation in BiH, the creation of such an entity within Kosovo sparked doubts about the stability of Kosovo in the long term and the influence of Serbia (and Russia) on the Community.

More so, the principle of self-determination, when used to favour Kosovar independence, was used as an argument for the independence of Republika Srpska. This was best seen in the public statements of RS leadership and some fringe elements within Serbian national politics for a sort of compensation between Kosovo and RS. This would mean that Serbia should recognise Kosovo only if it gets RS in return, sparking reactions from pro-Bosnian political actors in BiH. In practice, any sort of compensation at the expense of BiH is difficult to happen due to two main reasons. The first one is the international presence in both BiH and Kosovo institutionalised in the form of EUFOR and KFOR, respectively, as well as OHR and EULEX, and the second one is actually translating public statements into policy. How do you do that without sparking a region-wide conflict in a region where any sort of attempts at border changes ended up with violent regional conflicts?

On the other hand, the topic of recognition of Kosovo, as well as some political leaders from Kosovo are quite popular in BiH due to their perceived tough stance on Serbia. This has resulted in several bilateral meetings between high-ranking Kosovar and BiH officials. One of the more recent ones occurred in 2023 in Paris between Kosovo PM Albin Kurti and BiH Presidency members Željko Komšić and Denis Bečirović, during which the topic of the said agreements was discussed, as well as future economic cooperation within the Berlin Process framework. In June 2024, PM Kurti met with the director of Srebrenica Memorial Center, Emir Suljagić. During the meeting, the cooperation between the Srebrenica Memorial Center and the Insitute for documenting war crimes in Kosovo (IPRR) was agreed upon, with the official memorandum of understanding to be signed later this year. Additionally, Sarajevo major Benjamina Karić visited Prishtina in April 2024, during which she met with the mayor of Prishtina, Perparim Rama. More so, Sarajevo mayor Benjamina Karić and several other prominent BiH political leaders are often posting photos on their social media accounts with various leaders from Kosovo, such as President Vjosa Osmani or the Deputy PM Emilija Rexhepi, who is of Bosniak origin, both of which are very popular in the country due to their international standings on topics related to BiH, including the Srebrenica genocide.

„More so, the principle of self-determination, when used to favour Kosovar independence, was used as an argument for the independence of Republika Srpska. This was best seen in the public statements of RS leadership and some fringe elements within Serbian national politics for a sort of compensation between Kosovo and RS.“
„Kosovo was amongst the top five markets for milk and dairy products from BiH, but the exports were severely limited in 2018 due to the decision of Kosovo to impose 100% tariffs on goods from Serbia and BiH.“

Economic Relations

However, despite the lack of official political contacts between the two countries, there is some economic exchange between BiH and Kosovo. According to official data published by the Central Bank of BiH, while there are no records of BiH FDI to Kosovo, there are some exports to the country. As of the second quarter of 2024, exports to Kosovo were around €15 million, while for the period between 2020-2023, the number was, on average €50-60 million, with the main exports being iron and steel products and food and dairy products. Kosovo was amongst the top five markets for milk and dairy products from BiH, but the exports were severely limited in 2018 due to the decision of Kosovo to impose 100% tariffs on goods from Serbia and BiH. The decision was justified by perceived negative policies from the two toward Kosovo and cost BiH around €30 million in the initial months when the decision was in effect. As of 2024, there are no official statements that point to the change of this policy from Kosovo.

From the Kosovo side, it is important to note that there is no official data on the exports to BiH from 2021 onwards. Exports from Kosovo are somewhat meager as compared to BiH, as the exports to the country are €6.383, €7.286, and  €11.249 for 2019, 2020, and 2021 respectively, with the goods exported being unknown due to the said lack of official data.



The Future of BiH-Kosovo Relations



Outside of the concerns outlined, the potential for cooperation is there. BiH and Kosovo can cooperate on a number of different levels, starting from the Berlin Process framework as it includes deep and comprehensive economic, security, and political cooperation not just between the two countries, but among all six Western Balkan countries.

The first step to ramping up the cooperation between the two countries could be some sort of economic representation in the two countries‘ capitals, which would be used to further economic cooperation. However, when discussing this with political leaders from RS, this potential policy vector was not that well received, despite the fact Kosovo already has a representation in Belgrade, and Serbia has one in Prishtina, both of which stem from the initial days of the Brussels Agreement. In this sense, entity leaders showed more conservative views than Serbian officials. 

On the other hand, as per an interview with an unnamed RS official, the potential institutional representation between the two countries could still be an option, should it come as part of a wider regional cooperation effort that encompasses all six of the Western Balkan countries and would aim for more economic and political cooperation in the region. In essence, yes, BiH and Kosovo can open offices in their respective capitals, however, not through their own initiative and policy but through a green light from four other regional actors, all of whom, except Serbia, have recognised Kosovo. Given the fact that a new regional economic cooperation initiative is currently not in the purview, and having in mind the fact that Kosovo exports to BiH are meagre to the point of no data, a special focus should be the furthering of economic relations between the two countries. The way this could be done is via an office of the Kosovo Chamber of Commerce in Sarajevo and the Foreign Trade Chamber of BiH in Prishtina. The issue of non-recognition plays little to no part in this as the office is not diplomatic in nature, with its whole purpose is to increase trade between the two countries. On Kosovos’ part, this could be done through a cooperation agreement with Sarajevo Canton, which already hosted several fairly similar offices. This would enable trade to go through more easily, while casual connection would lead to more regional cooperation with recognition as the end goal.



„The first step to ramping up the cooperation between the two countries could be some sort of economic representation in the two countries‘ capitals, which would be used to further economic cooperation.“
„Should both countries mend their political relations, any other change of policy like the freedom of movement, economic exchange or cultural ties will come naturally.“



Conclusion

The relations between BiH and Kosovo are challenging on several different levels. These challenges are observed in the political climates in both countries, especially in BiH, as BiH, or RS more specifically, is the one that is stopping any significant cooperation with Kosovo. When diving more deeply into the topic, one can observe that the root of the difficult relations between Kosovo and BiH is, in its essence, political in nature and, as such, can be adjusted as the two countries advance towards the EU. Should both countries mend their political relations, any other change of policy like the freedom of movement, economic exchange or cultural ties will come naturally. 

More so, both countries share the same neighbor that they perceive as the main security threat to them (IRI Western Balkans Poll, 2024). However, the will to further relations between the two countries exists, despite it being warranted through regional fora and not bilateral agreements. The momentum in this, especially personified in the strong international presence in both countries, should be utilised to kickstart a new region-wide initiative that would focus specifically on security and defence. This new initiative could be done through the framework of the NATO-led Partnership for Peace, of which BiH is a member, already in its fourth year of the Annual National Programme (ANP), while Kosovo is an aspiring member. 

Given the fact that the initiative is focusing on security and defence, it could grow to encompass the entire region as well. A good starting point for this can be the proposal for the creation of the Sarajevo-based Western Balkan Defense College, as proposed by the Central Europe Defense Cooperation and pushed for by Austria, Croatia, Slovenia, and Czechia. While this initiative is aiming for an increase in interoperability between the six Western Balkan countries and CEE, a side effect of it will be an increase in political dialogue and regional cooperation, which in turn will have a positive impact on the economy and stability. This could be done in the immediate aftermath of the NATO July Summit in Washington when the Alliance celebrates 75 years of its existence. If done, this initiative can be proven useful for the wider EU-accession process of the entire region, but the end goal, besides EU membership, should be the recognition of Kosovo by the other two non-recognizers in the region, as a way to achieve permanent stability for the Western Balkans.

Sources:

       Omar Memišević is a Research Fellow at the Strategic Analysis Think Tank.

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