Sino-Georgian Strategic Partnership: The Essence of the Deal, Implications on the EU Candidacy, and the State of Foreign Policy

Matúš Vicen

During the visit of Georgia’s PM Irakli Gharibashvili to China in 2023, the China-Georgia bilateral relations were fostered and promoted to a strategic partnership, promoting stronger political, economic, cultural, and international cooperation. This enhanced partnership might represent another step in the Georgian shift in the foreign policy directory which could be caused by the frustration from the integration process into the Euro-Atlantic structures despite advances such as the EU granting Georgia candidacy status. On the other hand, the deepening of relations between these two countries could be just Chinese strategic calculations using a shadow over the region to build Anaklia Port.

„The Summit was meant to be the highlight of the Croatian Presidency in the Council of the EU in the first semester of 2020, but the global pandemics forced the change of plans. The Summit had to take place online.“

Photo: Shutterstock.com

Mutual ties gradually evolving and strategically gaining importance

China was among the first countries to recognise the independence of Georgia in 1992, and since then, it has maintained stable and continuously developing relations. China, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, recognised the importance of Georgia and the strategic significance of its location. The Russian annexation of the Georgian territories in 2008 and their recognition as de facto states set a landmark in the relations between Georgia and China since China stood behind the Georgian territorial integrity. Bilateral relations deepened in 2010 when the countries signed an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation, and since then, mutual relations have steadily enhanced.

Georgia’s importance and geographic location have strengthened since the famously announced Belt and Road Initiative (2013), of which Georgia is a significant member. This created an open window for China’s middle corridor, avoiding the northern route crossing Russian territory. China favours the middle corridor due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent blockage of the northern corridor. The same applies to Iran (southern corridor) since both countries are internationally isolated. The middle corridor creates the ideal route for China’s connectivity plans and to get access to the Mediterranean Sea, which means subsequent access to European ports in which China has shareholdings, such as Piraeus, Antwerp, Hamburg and Stockholm. The warmer relations with Georgia bear many additional benefits to China besides the access to sea routes, namely the easier reach to the EU’s single market since Georgia has possessed the advantages of an Association Agreement (AA) with the European Union since 2016, creating a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The Sino-Georgian economic ties strengthened again in 2018 when a Free Trade Agreement was signed between these two states.

„China, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, recognised the importance of Georgia and the strategic significance of its location.“
„Those three pillars of the Chinese proposal for international development and peace suit the new Georgian approach to foreign policy, where multilateralism and multi-polar global order match the multi-vector concept of external relations.“

What’s the essence of the partnership?

The deal made by former Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili in China consists of four domains of cooperation. Firstly, the political domain emphasises the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and cooperation of local and central governments. The issue of territorial integrity was crucial in light of the Taiwanese elections since Georgia recognises the one-China principle and pushes it even further by not recognising Taiwanese passports, making it the only country doing so. What might be even more interesting is the emphasis on the enhanced cooperation between governmental, legislative, regional, and party organs. Since China became one of the main players in the international system and the main counterbalance to the US hegemony of world governance, its interests and capabilities have changed. This means that the need of strongly illiberal/autocratic China is to change its global surroundings and standards and to tackle the insecurity of the regime in the world led by democratic institutions, by spreading and supporting autocratic governments and preventing democratisation in the world. In other words – bolstering democratic backsliding, which includes Georgia.

We can sort of look a few steps ahead in developing relations, specifically in the case of Serbia, where cooperation with China is much deeper, which is reflected in deep security cooperation (e.g. Chinese police patrols or Chinese surveillance technologies provided by Chinese companies). Newly, the Hungarian government followed Vucic’s steps in establishing a Chinese police presence in the country, which is another well-established illiberal regime.

Secondly, the economic domain accentuates the cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative. It highlights the significance of the vast array of economic ties, emphasising the usage of Georgian transport routes to the EU market. The BRI enjoyed the spotlight since Georgia organised the 4th Tbilisi Silk Road Forum in late October 2023. The Forum was attended mainly by representatives from countries significant for the Middle Corridor but also countries involved and actively benefiting from the BRI such as delegates from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Hungary, and Serbia.

Next, the people-to-people domain focused mainly on mutual tourism, student exchange, and cultural cooperation in the sense of establishing new Confucius Institutes (CI). The latter might represent a threat to intellectual freedom since universities and other educational institutions with established CIs reported cases of self-censorship in matters of Tibet, Taiwan, or the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Due to the CI’s direct link to the Chinese central government, CIs also pose a risk of espionage and leakage of information about classified military technologies. CIs should not be demonised in general, but they should be seen as another tool of Chinese Soft power.

Finally, the international domain discusses Georgian support of Chinese activities and initiatives launched in recent years such as the Global Development Initiative, which is based on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and aims to restore development after the COVID-19 pandemic. Georgia also supports the Global Security Initiative, which upholds the multilateral and multi-polar approach to international security, advocates for the UN as an integral institution for maintaining global security, and promotes dialogue over force. Lastly, there is mentioned a Global Civilization Initiative which represents a third pillar in China’s approach to world sustainable development. It represents China’s proposal for respecting every country’s differences but with the shared goal of security, development, and self/determination. Those three pillars of the Chinese proposal for international development and peace suit the new Georgian approach to foreign policy, where multilateralism and multi-polar global order match the multi-vector concept of external relations.

Photo: Government of Georgia

Schizophrenic foreign policy or balancing the odds?

It was less than five months after the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with China the European Union granted candidate status to Georgia, which had been endlessly preparing for it. The decision in Brussels was made after nearly two years from the official Georgian application, which was to some extent bolstered by the Russian war in Ukraine. A month after the guarantees from the EU, Irakli Kobakhidze, now the PM of Georgia, went on a six-day visit to China to speed up and foster the relations arising from the SPA. Furthermore, Georgia has not followed Western steps in imposing sanctions against Russia and providing aid to Ukraine by the Georgian government, which cannot be said about the civil society and private sector, which had facilitated numerous initiatives and provided Ukraine with huge amounts of food, clothes, and needed supply. Even Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili said during the meeting with Zelensky, “Today I’m standing where Georgia should be standing. I’m standing by President Zelensky’s side, by the side of Ukraine. To stand beside our friend who is fighting for freedom, independence, European future…” and that Ukraine is ”the nation who represents Georgia’s dignity today”. These steps might indicate that the Western path of Georgia shouldn’t be taken for granted and that the geopolitical orientation of this country is uncertain.

Additionally, the European Commission’s report on Georgia’s readiness to join the EU recognised moderate progress in implementing 12 priorities set by European institutions. Notable among these priorities are gender equality, the establishment of an independent Ombudsperson, and adherence to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Some other priorities were at least moderately successful in implementation. Namely, the political stabilisation and assurance of the working legislative process, which was boycotted by some MPs, the cross-party discussions take place at least in EU-related matters. Another moderately successful is the fight against corruption and “de-oligarchisation”, where an Action plan was endorsed, and an Anti-Corruption Bureau was implemented, recommended by the Venice Commission. The initially well-developing involvement of civil society in decision-making processes has been halted by the controversial act against foreign agents, which was later withdrawn but undermined the trust of civil society. Furthermore, the EU Commission stressed in its report that Georgia had insufficiently aligned with the EU policy on external relations, such as export controls or restrictive measures against Russia. Thus, Georgia and is expected to increase alignment to achieve needed compliance with aquis.

We can observe this transition of directions of the Georgian foreign policy as an outcome of an evaluation of the integration process to the Euro-Atlantic structures and balancing the odds to get investments to the country and have multiple options in the foreign policy directory. Thus, the People’s Republic of China seems like a legitimate choice since Russia is, for obvious reasons, not the first option for Georgia, and since China has emerged as a “new” superpower balancing the West, her investments, possibilities, and capabilities offer Georgia one of the alternatives to the Euro-Atlantic, democracy-conditioned, alliance. The aforementioned is supported by the fact that Georgia has been falling behind in aligning with the accession criteria in comparison with two partners in Eastern Neighbourhood, Ukraine and Moldova. Georgian lagging in the alignment process with the EU policies and practices might be the reason or the cause of the Georgian multi-vector foreign policy.

Directions of Georgian foreign policy haven’t changed since the resignation of Irakli Gharibashvili because his successor, Irakli Kobakhidze, is pro-actively continuing in his steps towards the East. Besides his visit to China in mid-January 2024, shortly after his inauguration, the Georgian government reached an agreement with China on visa-free travel. Kobakhidze stated “On our part, there is utmost desire to deepen the strategic partnership both with the United States of America and China. The rest depends on the respective countries. Relationships are not one-way, but two-way issues”, which indicates that balancing between East and West is and will be on the table for the Georgian government. This reluctance toward relations with the US, the Georgian Prime minister described through a strategic partnership which is unsuccessful respectively invisible, as he mentioned, “This was also expressed in concrete details – for example, there have been no high-level visits between the countries for many years, [for] about six, seven years…”

„Furthermore, the EU Commission stressed in its report that Georgia had insufficiently aligned with the EU policy on external relations, such as export controls or restrictive measures against Russia. Thus, Georgia and is expected to increase alignment to achieve needed compliance with aquis.“
„One of the most significant Chinese investment projects in Georgia, related to the Middle Corridor, is the Anaklia Black Sea port located on the north-western coast, right under the disputed territory of Abkhazia.“

The Middle Corridor in the making – the Ankalia deep sea port and the highway connecting Georgia

One of the most significant Chinese investment projects in Georgia, related to the Middle Corridor, is the Anaklia Black Sea port located on the north-western coast, right under the disputed territory of Abkhazia. The project had its own long and complicated history when the beginning of the construction was cancelled twice; the last time, the consortium with the USA was established, and the deal was signed, but it was halted by the Georgian government. But nowadays, according to Kobakhidze, the selection process of the construction company will be soon over and the company will be known in May this year.

It is important to mention that according to the Georgian Minister of Finance, Levan Davitashvili, one considered company is from China, and the second is from Switzerland. With Chinese companies, concerns arise since contracts on investments are conditioned by the use of Chinese construction companies, which effectively hinders the EU’s pro/transparency policies, by circumventing the whole public procurement process. As the deputy head of mission of the EU delegation to Georgia, Asuncion Sanchez Ruiz stressed, “Georgia has applied to the EU, and whoever the final investor is, we need to make sure that it’s in line with the [EU-Georgia] Association Agreement” and that “the EU has a strong preference to see European firms involved in the port” since the project has been selected within the Global Gateway. Given that we still don’t know who will win the tender, the strategic partnership, and the fact that China is already constructing a highway project connecting Tbilisi with the western part of the country, the outcome may not be surprising. It would mean that another obstacle in the Georgian alignment process with the EU will appear alongside internal political problems.

Conclusion

The Sino-Georgian relations have significantly risen in importance, and the Strategic Partnership signed in 2023 confirmed this dynamic. The deepening cooperation with China signals a shift in Georgia’s foreign policy towards the multi-vector directory of external relations. The steps of the Georgian government indicate a strong recognition of Gergia’s strategic importance in facilitating international trade between Asia and Europe. Georgia is a crucial gateway to the central Asia trade route, known as the Middle Corridor, which bypasses the northern Russian route. However, this shift also raises concerns about Georgian Euro-Atlantic integration and its potential challenges in aligning with EU policies.

„The steps of the Georgian government indicate a strong recognition of Gergia’s strategic importance in facilitating international trade between Asia and Europe.“
Sources:
  • Dante Shultz, Caspian Policy Center, China/Georgia Bilateral Relations, https://caspianpolicy.com/research/security-and-politics-program-spp/china-georgia-bilateral-relations
  • Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Georgia, Full text: Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and Georgia on Establishing a Strategic Partnership, http://ge.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/xwdt/202308/t20230807_11123383.htm
  • Eurasianet, Georgia: Amid tension with the West, Tbilisi makes it easier for Georgians to head East, https://eurasianet.org/georgia-amid-tension-with-the-west-tbilisi-makes-it-easier-for-georgians-to-head-east
  • European Commission, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/388e01b7-e283-4bc9-9d0a-5600ea49eda9_en?filename=SWD_2023_697%20Georgia%20report.pdf
  • European Commission, EU/Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, https://trade.ec.europa.eu/access-to-markets/en/content/eu-georgia-deep-and-comprehensive-free-trade-area
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  • Forbes Georgia, 18 Months of War – How Did Georgia Help Ukraine So Far. https://forbes.ge/en/18-months-of-war-how-did-georgia-help-ukraine-so-far/
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  • Luka Pertaia, RFERL, No Real Relations’: Georgia Pivots Toward China As Taiwan Readies For Crucial Vote, https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-pivots-china-taiwan-crucial-vote/32763670.html
  • MFA PRC, Global Development Initiative — Building on 2030 SDGs for Stronger, Greener and Healthier Global Development (Concept Paper), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/topics_665678/GDI/wj/202305/P020230511396286957196.pdf
  • MFA PRC, The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html
  • Michael Beckley a Hal Brands, Journal of Democracy, China’s Threat to Global Democracy, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/chinas-threat-to-global-democracy/
  • Natalie Sabandadze, Carnegie Europe, EU/Georgia Relations: A Local Show of the Global Theater, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2023/11/16/eu-georgia-relations-local-show-of-global-theater-pub-90995
  • Reid Standish and Tamuna Chkareuli, RFERL, The Black Sea Port That Could Define Georgia’s Geopolitical Future, https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-anaklia-port-geopolitics-russia-chna-eu/32547539.html
  • Reuters, Chinese police officers join Serbian colleagues on the beat in Belgrade, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1W81AP/

Matúš Vicen is an Intern at the Strategic Analysis  Young Leaders Programme.

Disclaimer: Views presented here are those of the author solely and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Strategic Analysis.

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