The deal made by former Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili in China consists of four domains of cooperation. Firstly, the political domain emphasises the mutual recognition of territorial integrity and cooperation of local and central governments. The issue of territorial integrity was crucial in light of the Taiwanese elections since Georgia recognises the one-China principle and pushes it even further by not recognising Taiwanese passports, making it the only country doing so. What might be even more interesting is the emphasis on the enhanced cooperation between governmental, legislative, regional, and party organs. Since China became one of the main players in the international system and the main counterbalance to the US hegemony of world governance, its interests and capabilities have changed. This means that the need of strongly illiberal/autocratic China is to change its global surroundings and standards and to tackle the insecurity of the regime in the world led by democratic institutions, by spreading and supporting autocratic governments and preventing democratisation in the world. In other words – bolstering democratic backsliding, which includes Georgia.

We can sort of look a few steps ahead in developing relations, specifically in the case of Serbia, where cooperation with China is much deeper, which is reflected in deep security cooperation (e.g. Chinese police patrols or Chinese surveillance technologies provided by Chinese companies). Newly, the Hungarian government followed Vucic’s steps in establishing a Chinese police presence in the country, which is another well-established illiberal regime.

Secondly, the economic domain accentuates the cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative. It highlights the significance of the vast array of economic ties, emphasising the usage of Georgian transport routes to the EU market. The BRI enjoyed the spotlight since Georgia organised the 4th Tbilisi Silk Road Forum in late October 2023. The Forum was attended mainly by representatives from countries significant for the Middle Corridor but also countries involved and actively benefiting from the BRI such as delegates from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Hungary, and Serbia.

Next, the people-to-people domain focused mainly on mutual tourism, student exchange, and cultural cooperation in the sense of establishing new Confucius Institutes (CI). The latter might represent a threat to intellectual freedom since universities and other educational institutions with established CIs reported cases of self-censorship in matters of Tibet, Taiwan, or the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Due to the CI’s direct link to the Chinese central government, CIs also pose a risk of espionage and leakage of information about classified military technologies. CIs should not be demonised in general, but they should be seen as another tool of Chinese Soft power.

Finally, the international domain discusses Georgian support of Chinese activities and initiatives launched in recent years such as the Global Development Initiative, which is based on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and aims to restore development after the COVID-19 pandemic. Georgia also supports the Global Security Initiative, which upholds the multilateral and multi-polar approach to international security, advocates for the UN as an integral institution for maintaining global security, and promotes dialogue over force. Lastly, there is mentioned a Global Civilization Initiative which represents a third pillar in China’s approach to world sustainable development. It represents China’s proposal for respecting every country’s differences but with the shared goal of security, development, and self/determination. Those three pillars of the Chinese proposal for international development and peace suit the new Georgian approach to foreign policy, where multilateralism and multi-polar global order match the multi-vector concept of external relations.

One of the most significant Chinese investment projects in Georgia, related to the Middle Corridor, is the Anaklia Black Sea port located on the north-western coast, right under the disputed territory of Abkhazia. The project had its own long and complicated history when the beginning of the construction was cancelled twice; the last time, the consortium with the USA was established, and the deal was signed, but it was halted by the Georgian government. But nowadays, according to Kobakhidze, the selection process of the construction company will be soon over and the company will be known in May this year.

It is important to mention that according to the Georgian Minister of Finance, Levan Davitashvili, one considered company is from China, and the second is from Switzerland. With Chinese companies, concerns arise since contracts on investments are conditioned by the use of Chinese construction companies, which effectively hinders the EU’s pro/transparency policies, by circumventing the whole public procurement process. As the deputy head of mission of the EU delegation to Georgia, Asuncion Sanchez Ruiz stressed, “Georgia has applied to the EU, and whoever the final investor is, we need to make sure that it’s in line with the [EU-Georgia] Association Agreement” and that “the EU has a strong preference to see European firms involved in the port” since the project has been selected within the Global Gateway. Given that we still don’t know who will win the tender, the strategic partnership, and the fact that China is already constructing a highway project connecting Tbilisi with the western part of the country, the outcome may not be surprising. It would mean that another obstacle in the Georgian alignment process with the EU will appear alongside internal political problems.