A local protest in the Tavush region grew into mass anti-government demonstrations in Yerevan

On May 4, a group of people from the village of Kirants, led by Archbishop Bagrat (Srbazan) Galstanyan, leader of the Diocese of Tavush, began a march on Yerevan. They aimed to protest the ongoing process of border delimitation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as agreed by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Azerbaijani counterparts.

Residents in Kirants have expressed fears that the delimitation process would divide their village between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Based on a preliminary map of the delimited border, several houses, lands, and a recently built school would fall on the Azerbaijani side of the border. Others have raised concerns that a closer border with Azerbaijan would raise risks of Azerbaijani attacks.

What began as a small protest march in the Tavush region steadily picked up supporters along the way before reaching Yerevan. By the time the marchers arrived in the capital on May 9, their numbers had swelled to several thousand. Addressing an estimated crowd of up to 20,000 in Yerevan, Galstanyan accused the prime minister of deceiving citizens about Armenia’s transfer of four villages to Azerbaijan. Pashinyan “lied, misled, and ultimately terrorised and threatened the people. We have come to demand answers for all of this”, Galstanyan said during the Yerevan rally. The cleric went on to demand Pashinyan’s resignation within one hour.

The rally marked the largest public protest in Yerevan since 2018 when Pashinyan himself swept into power amid popular unrest with the previous government. On May 13, civil disobedience commenced in central Yerevan as supporters of the “Tavush in the Name of Motherland” movement obstructed Abovyan Street using garbage cans and street benches. Similar efforts were made to block Myasnikyan Avenue, one of the city’s main thoroughfares, along with other busy roads such as Tigran the Great Avenue, Azatutyan and Komitas avenues, and Tbilisi highway, prompting police interventions and subsequent arrests. Altogether, 200 protesters were detained in the capital by May 17, with opposition representatives accusing the police of using disproportionate force against them.

At the same time, at the end of April 2024, a newly established association of retired senior diplomats critical of the Armenian government voiced “unconditional support” for ongoing protests against Pashinian’s decision to cede several border areas to Azerbaijan.

Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan criticised diplomats who aligned with the protest movement, branding them „deserters“ and expressing disappointment at their involvement in internal political affairs. Mirzoyan highlighted the efforts to shield the country’s diplomatic corps from domestic conflicts and denounced diplomats’ departures during times of national crisis.

Azerbaijan and Armenia’s border delimitation commissions signed the agreement on April 15, agreeing to delimit the border on the basis of a 1976 Soviet Armed Forces map. The deal affected several key border areas, with control of four abandoned villages and the Kirants bridge being handed over to Azerbaijan. A new section of the road connecting Yerevan with Tbilisi is also expected to be built in two to three months.

Sources:

• BARDOUKA Yousef, OC Media, Protesters against border delimitation in northeast Armenia march to Yerevan, https://oc-media.org/protesters-against-border-delimitation-in-northeast-armenia-march-to-yerevan/

• AVETISYAN Ani, OC Media, “Armenia“s opposition condemns border agreement as „illegal“ as protest continues”, https://oc-media.org/armenias-opposition-condemns-border-agreement-as-illegal-as-protest-continues/

• Eurasianet.org, “Armenia: Protesters call on Pashinyan to leave”, https://eurasianet.org/armenia-protesters-call-on-pashinyan-to-leave

• Caucasus Watch, “Yerevan Protests Lead to Clashes with Police, Multiple Arrests Reported”, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/yerevan-protests-lead-to-clashes-with-police-multiple-arrests-reported.html

• Azatutyun.am, “Ex-Diplomats Back Protests Against Land Handover To Azerbaijan”, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32929365.html

Amid sanctions and a boom in trade, Yerevan is unable to disentangle the economy from Russia

Tax records in Armenia highlight the government’s challenge in trying to disentangle the country’s economy from Russia, reported Eurasianet.org. Trade with sanctions-strapped Russia has proven highly lucrative for many Armenian businesses, which have reportedly adapted to act as middlemen for Russian consumers cut off from direct access to Western goods. No entity seems to have benefited more than Mobile Center, an Armenian mobile phone and electronics retailer linked to local businessman Samvel Aleksanyan. The company’s revenue, allegedly boosted by exports to Russia, was such that it surpassed Armenia’s largest mining company to become the largest taxpayer in Armenia in terms of monetary contribution made to state coffers.

According to the Armenian government’s State Revenue Committee (SRC), the agency collected over 51 million USD (20 billion Armenian AMD) from MobileCenter during the first quarter of 2024, three times higher than the taxes paid by the company during the same period the previous year. Before 2024, the company had not ranked among Armenia’s top taxpaying entities.

The overall total of tax revenue gathered by the state during the first four months of 2024 reached about 846 million USD (330 billion AMD).  Mobile Center’s tax payments topped Gazprom Armenia, the Russia-owned national gas distributor in Armenia, and Zangezur Copper and Molybdenum Combine, another company in Armenia with strong Russian ties.

Armenia’s trade turnover with Russia skyrocketed following the invasion of Ukraine, with the country coming under wide suspicion of assisting Russia in sanctions evasion. Armenia’s exports to Russia tripled in 2022 and doubled during the first half of 2023. Last fall, Armenian government officials said Russia accounts for almost 40 per cent of Armenia’s annual exports.

Nevertheless, a rapid growth in Armenia’s exports to Russia, driven in large measure by Western sanctions against Moscow, appears to have slowed down significantly in the fourth quarter of last year.

Full-year data released by the Armenian government’s Statistical Committee shows that they rose by less than 39 per cent to 3.4 billion USD in 2023. This suggests that the lucrative re-exports largely stagnated last fall and December. The recent introduction of a new Russian tax on imports of used and old cars may have been one of the factors behind the slowdown.

Also, the re-exports prompted concern from European and especially US officials in early 2023. They pressed the Armenian authorities to comply with Western sanctions. The authorities introduced mandatory government licenses in May for shipments of microchips, transformers, video cameras, antennas, and other electronic equipment to Russia.

Russian-Armenian trade soared by more than 43 per cent to 7.3 billion USD. It grew steadily even before the war in Ukraine, not least because of Armenia’s accession in 2014 to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. Russia has since replaced the EU as Armenia’s number-one trading partner. According to Armenian government data, Russia accounted for over 35 per cent of the South Caucasus country’s foreign trade last year, compared with the EU’s 13 per cent share.

Sources:

• Eurasinet.org, “Armenia: Tax records tell a tale of continuing economic dependency on Russia”, https://eurasianet.org/armenia-tax-records-tell-tale-of-continuing-economic-dependency-on-russia

• Azatutyun.am, “Growth In Armenian Exports To Russia Moderates”, https://www.azatutyun.am/a/32827996.html

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan press ahead with ambitious electricity export plan

As reported by Eurasianet.org, the energy ministers of the three countries announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding in early May to explore their joint electricity export potential by harnessing mainly wind and solar power.

Kazakhstan is also aiming to boost its hydropower generating capacity. In outlining cooperation plans, the tripartite memo envisions laying a “high-voltage cable” on the Caspian Sea’s seabed. Technical specifications for such a transmission line have already been developed, according to Kazakh Energy Minister Almassadam Satkaliyev. “A proposed business model will be developed for the development of international transmission corridors (financing, revenue flow and ownership) and the sale of green energy to the countries of the European Union,” a ministry statement quoted Satkaliyev as saying.

The three countries have wasted little time in pursuing the plan. Satkaliiev said on May 10 that a feasibility study was underway. He told journalists that the EU had given the budding consortium an expression of “interest in purchasing clean electricity.” The feasibility study will work out construction and financing details and is expected to produce preliminary estimates by the end of the year. It is too early to put a price tag on the project or the amount of power exports involved. “We are talking about a fairly large amount of investment,” Satkaliyev said.

The goal of exporting electricity to the EU fits with plans unveiled by all three countries to significantly expand renewable energy generating capacity in the coming years. The chief catalyst for power exports is Uzbekistan, which aims to generate an additional 20 Gigawatts (GW) via renewable sources by 2030. Meeting that target would raise the country’s total renewable capacity to 27 GW. By April, the government had signed deals to develop wind and solar facilities projected to produce 12 GWs. In May, Uzbekistan entered into contracts for another 6 GW.

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan seem destined to play more of a facilitating role in the power export arrangement. Given its abundance of fossil fuels, Astana’s renewable goals seem more modest than Uzbekistan’s. Kazakhstan currently generates about 2.9 GW of power via renewable sources and hopes to add at least another 5 GW by 2030, according to Satkaliyev. However, much of that capacity may be needed at home as Kazakhstan grapples with a power deficit that saw the country become a net importer of electricity in 2023.

Azerbaijan aims to generate 5 GW of solar and wind power by 2030. The MoU Baku entered into with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan potentially builds on a 2023 agreement that Azerbaijan concluded with EU states, including Hungary and Romania, to export power via an underwater cable traversing the Black Sea with a capacity of 1,000 Megawatts. The feasibility study for the Black Sea project was conducted before Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022, thus raising questions about its viability under wartime conditions.

As reported, the first meeting in this format took place on November 14, 2023, in Baku. The final communique included issues relating to power exchange with a focus on renewable sources, development and export of green hydrogen and ammonia, cooperation in the construction of necessary infrastructure, and other matters of mutual interest. According to the document, the three countries agreed to create a joint venture to export electricity and to conduct a feasibility study for the project. Other countries of the region will be able to join the project in the future.

Sources:

• Eurasianet.org, „Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan press ahead with ambitious electricity export plan”, https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-kazakhstan-and-uzbekistan-press-ahead-with-ambitious-electricity-export-plan

• Interfax.com, “Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan discuss electricity supply from Central Asia to Europe through Azerbaijan”, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/101911/

US congressperson accused of accepting 360,000 USD in Azerbaijani bribes

Henry Cuellar, an influential South Texas Democrat, was indicted with his wife Imelda on charges of accepting almost 600,000 USD in bribes from Azerbaijan and a Mexican commercial bank, Banco Azteca.

According to the indictment, the Cuellars were allegedly setting up a scheme to accept payments from Azerbaijan’s state-run oil and gas company, which were also laundered through fake consulting contracts to shell companies owned by Imelda Cuellar. In exchange, Henry Cuellar allegedly pushed US policy that favoured Azerbaijan.

It included adding language to defence spending legislation to prioritise ties to countries in the region, including Azerbaijan, and working to kill legislation prioritised by members who supported Armenian interests, the indictment alleges. Prosecutors say that Henry and Imelda Cuellar crafted two years-long schemes to get bribes from foreign entities – an oil and gas company “wholly owned and controlled by the Government of Azerbaijan, and a bank headquartered in Mexico City.”

In exchange for bribe payments from the Azerbaijan oil company, Cuellar “agreed to perform official acts in his capacity as a Member of Congress, to commit acts in violation of his official duties, and to act as an agent of the Government of Azerbaijan” and the bank, the indictment says.

A spokesperson for House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries released a statement

shortly after Cuellar’s charges were reported, saying that the congressman is entitled to the presumption of innocence. But, spokesperson Christie Stephenson said, Cuellar will temporarily step down from his top spot on a House Appropriations Subcommittee while the investigation is ongoing.

Sources:

• SCHERER Jasper, Texas Tribune, “Two political consultants plead guilty in Henry Cuellar bribery case”, https://www.texastribune.org/2024/05/09/henry-cuellar-political-consultants-plea-deal-guilty/

• TALBOT Haley, RABINOWITZ Hannah, CNN, „Rep. Henry Cuellar and his wife allegedly took nearly $600,000 in bribes, the indictment says”, https://edition.cnn.com/2024/05/03/politics/henry-cuellar-indictment-doj/index.html

President Zurabishvili outlines plan for temporary government following elections

As reported by the OC Media, Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has invited opposition parties to sign a “Georgian Charter” pledging to support the President’s nominations for a new, temporary government after the elections with the stated aim of carrying out pro-European reforms.

At an announcement outside the Orbeliani Palace marking Independence Day, Zourabichvili said she would choose a government of „distinguished, selected, and professional members of society“ rather than politicians. The President said the new government, to be formed after upcoming elections, would be „tasked with implementing a specific European plan“, after which new elections would be held in a „new, free environment“ in late 2025.

She said the Charter did not entail a joint opposition electoral list. „Political parties should determine their own election tactics and strategies once they have signed the Charter — that matter is not mine“, she said.

The President also stressed that autumn’s election would be a referendum on the country’s EU membership. „In these elections, we have to decide not who we vote for, but what we vote for! That is why these elections will, in reality, be a referendum where we have to answer the following question: do we want Europe or not? And when we vote for any under-signatory party of this Charter, we are, in fact, voting for the “Georgian Charter” and, therefore, for a European future“, she said.

In addition to a promise to support the President’s choice of temporary government, the Charter included a number of pledged reforms to be carried out before new elections would be held.

Signatories would promise to immediately repeal legislation passed by the ruling party that „contradict [Georgia’s] European path and European recommendations“. These included the foreign agent law, the offshore law, and more. The Charter also promised an amnesty for protesters against the foreign agent law. It laid out a series of sweeping judicial reforms. Both local and international government critics have accused the ruling party of capturing the judiciary, supporting an influential „clan“ of judges who rule on politically sensitive cases.  It promises a „fundamental reform“ of the State Security Service and Ministry of Internal Affairs  „to deconcentrate the power“.

„Effective parliamentary control will be established over the activities of each institution, which will protect them from political influence“, the Charter reads. The Charter also vows to strengthen and make more independent the Special Investigation Service, which investigates police abuses, and the Anti-corruption Bureau.

The Charter vows to restore independence to the National Bank. Georgia’s central bank saw practically its entire upper management quit last year after new regulations were introduced to shield Georgian citizens from international sanctions. The new government would also be tasked with creating “appropriate conditions [to] hold free and fair elections“.

Following  Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili’s announcement of the “Georgian Charter” on May 26 nine opposition parties have so far pledged to sign it. These parties are: Girchi-More Freedom and Droa, United National Movement and Strategy Aghmashenebeli, Ahali, Lelo for Georgia, European Georgia, Republican Party, and Citizens. According to Civil.ge, the President has set June 1 as the deadline for signing these provisions and joining the Charter.

Georgian Dream’s parliamentary leader, Mamuka Mdinaradze, attacked the initiative on Sunday night. IPN cited him as saying it was not a “Georgian Charter” but a “charter of local war”. According to PM Irakli Kobakhidze, it is a pity that May 26, which is the National Independence Day, was used for political statements. “I don’t want to comment on the statements. It is a pity when May 26, which is the day of national independence, is used for political statements, it is not a day of political statements, it is a national holiday where we should all talk together, not about politics in a narrow sense, but about our common national task,” said Kobakhidze.

Sources:

• FABBRO Robin, OC Media, “President Zourabichvili outlines plan for the temporary government following elections”, https://oc-media.org/president-zourabichvili-announces-plan-for-temporary-government-following-elections/

• Civil.ge, News, “Opposition Parties to Sign Georgian Charter Initiated by President”, https://civil.ge/archives/609511

• Interpressnews.ge, “Irakli Kobakhidze: It is a pity when May 26, which is the day of national independence, is used for political statements”, https://www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/131782-irakli-kobakhidze-it-is-a-pity-when-may-26-which-is-the-day-of-national-independence-is-used-for-political-statements

Georgian Dream overturns President’s veto of the foreign agent law

On May 28, MPs from Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party overturned the President’s veto of the controversial foreign agent bill, passing it into law. At a plenary session of the Parliament, 84 MPs voted in favour of adopting the law unchanged. It will come into force in 60 days.

After the law passed, Speaker of the Parliament Shalva Papuashvili hailed his party for making an “important decision”. “No other people, no other country, no other power determines the life of our state and our people, and that’s exactly what this law is about”, he said.

Demonstrators gathered in front and behind the Parliament building from early morning hours as the ruling party prepared to overturn the presidential veto. Deliberations on the law were accompanied by loud chants from the crowd outside, calling on Georgian Dream MPs not to change Georgia’s foreign policy course by adopting a law that has been highly criticised by international partners.

The final adoption of the law follows almost two months of protests, during which protest leaders and government critics have faced police brutality and a spate of planned attacks near their homes by masked men. Several criminal cases and dozens of hefty fines were also filed against others.

Source:

• OC Media, “Georgian Dream overturns veto of foreign agent law”, https://oc-media.org/georgian-dream-overturns-veto-of-foreign-agent-law/

• Civil.ge, “Photo Story | Veto on Agents’ Law Overturned, Against the Backdrop of Mass Protests”, https://civil.ge/archives/610187