Strategic Analysis Caucasus Brief

Review of April 2026

Tomáš Baranec 

Armenia

Shutterstock.com

Pre-election situation in Armenia

Preparations for the upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia have been characterised by last-minute legislative changes, party mergers, and suspicions of pre-election corruption.

On April 21, the Country to Live party and the Strong Armenia bloc of parties signed a memorandum on joining forces ahead of the parliamentary election. The Country to Live party announced that the collaboration is built upon the following core pillars: The fundamental importance of Armenia as a free, independent, sovereign, and democratic state; The indisputable priority of the return of Armenian prisoners of war as the most critical prerequisite for restoring national dignity and establishing a just and lasting peace; The preservation of the exceptional role of the Holy Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC)-historically the pillar of national identity, faith, unity, and statehood; The imperative to restore trust between the state and the people; The strengthening of national solidarity and the effective consolidation of Pan-Armenian potential between Armenia and the Diaspora. Alongside the Strong Armenia party of businessman Samvel Karapetyan and Country to Live, the coalition includes two smaller, less prominent parties – New Era and United Armenians.

Earlier on April 4, the former President Serzh Sargsyan said his Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) has decided to opt out of the 2026 parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7 to avoid “dividing the opposition arena.”

Sargsyan, the HHK chairman, made the comments at his party’s 18th congress. “The HHK made this decision to set an example of subordinating individual ‘selves,’ intra-party interests, and political calculations to collective success. The decision not to participate directly in the elections is also largely based on meticulous sociological research showing that our supporters, almost without exception, are prepared to go to the polls and vote only for opposition parties. In other words, our voters’ voices will not be lost but will join those of opposition voters, contributing to the prevention of this government’s re-election,” Sargsyan said as cited by Armen Press.

In early April, Armenia’s Parliament adopted amendments to the electoral code prohibiting the use of personal names in party alliance names. The newly formed alliance of Russian–Armenian tycoon Samvel Karapetyan was the only bloc whose name included a personal name, OC Media writes.

The timing appeared to coincide with Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia party announcing on March 31 that it had formed a coalition named “Strong Armenia with Samvel Karapetyan”. Such regulation existed in the electoral code but was removed by the end of 2024 — Civil Contract MPs claim the removal was a result of a “technical error” that they recently noticed.

The opposition criticised the speedy changes to the electoral code, claiming there was a political pretext, as Karapetyan is Civil Contract’s main political opponent in the upcoming elections. ”The largest opposition political force that has declared its participation has already announced its name, and suddenly you introduce a law that restricts and prohibits doing that”, the head of the opposition I Have Honour faction, Hayk Mamijanyan, said.

By mid-April, Armenian authorities arrested 14 affiliates of Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia party. Authorities say the latest in a series of cases involving alleged electoral bribery. Two other party members were placed under investigation on the same charges one week earlier.

Armenia’s Anti-Corruption Committee announced that, based on their investigation, members of Strong Armenia and others registered as employees of the party’s affiliated non-governmental organisation, “distributed electoral bribes to a number of voters in the Artashat community of Ararat province”.

Ahead of these arrests, Armenian authorities launched several similar cases in recent months against Karapetyan’s party members, which, according to polls, is the main political opponent of Pashinyan’s Civil Contract in the upcoming elections, OC Media reports.

Sources:
  • GRIGORYAN Aline, Arminfo, “Country to Live party, Strong Armenia bloc sign memorandum on joint  participation in  upcoming parliamentary elections”, https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=100335&lang=3
  • ArmenPress, “Former President Serzh Sargsyan says Republican Party will skip June 7 elections to avoid dividing opposition”, https://armenpress.am/en/article/1246487
  • BARSEGHYAN Arshaluys, OC Media, “Major Armenian opposition alliance forced to drop Karapetyan’s name after legislative changes”, https://oc-media.org/major-armenian-opposition-alliance-forced-to-drop-karapetyans-name-after-legislative-changes/
  • BARSEGHYAN Arshaluys, OC Media, “Armenia arrests 14 affiliates of Karapetyan for alleged election bribery”, https://oc-media.org/armenia-arrests-14-affiliates-of-karapetyan-for-alleged-election-bribery/
Russia-Armenia relations on the rocks again

Relations between Moscow and Yerevan entered a new cycle of tension shortly before Armenia’s parliamentary elections. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 1. The sides discussed bilateral issues, as well as Armenia’s relations with the EU and the US and ongoing projects with both. The two leaders made lengthy televised remarks that totalled around 20 minutes.

Both parties praised bilateral relations, with Putin calling them “special” and formed “over centuries”, and Pashinyan assessed them as “very deep, very important for us”. Nevertheless, both parties also addressed several problematic issues in their mutual relations. Putin indirectly raised the issue of the criminal case against Russian–Armenian tycoon Samvel Karateptyan in the context of Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections on June 7. He noted that in Armenia, there were “many political forces that have a pro-Russian position” and that Russia would like them to “be able to participate in this domestic political work during the elections”. Putin also publicly warned that Yerevan’s eventual bid to join the European Union is “not compatible” with Armenia’s continued membership in the EAEU, which gives Armenian exporters tariff-free access to the Russian market.

In his press briefing, Pashinyan said that during the meeting with the Russian side, they “discussed in detail” Armenia’s proposal to transfer the management rights of Armenia’s railway network — currently held by Russia — to a third party. Just one day after the meeting, Russia announced “stricter requirements” on the import of Armenian products. “The range and the quantity of products that are being delivered give us grounds to believe that not all of the products entering [Russia] are from Armenia”, Sergei Dankvert, head of the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Supervision, told Vesti.

Highlighting the difference between EU and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) procedures, Dankvert said that Armenia allows “simplified access” to EU goods within its market, which “does not comply with the requirements” of the EAEU. “During inspections, we saw that these products are accompanied only by consignment notes, that is, movements approved by the European Commission”, which “forced [Russia] to take measures”.

Soon after Dankvert’s statements, the state body that oversees Russia’s alcohol and tobacco market, the Rosalkogoltabakkontrol, has begun the process of revoking the license of [Armenia’s] Proshyan Brandy Factory, which means the factory may be deprived of the right to sell its products in Russia. “According to our sources, new restrictions are expected in the near future. In particular, according to information, the next restriction will concern the Jermuk mineral waters factory [of Armenia]. Let us recall that the owner of this company is former RPA [i.e. the former ruling Republican Party of Armenia] MP Ashot Arsenyan, who is currently cooperating perfectly with the CC [i.e. the ruling Civil Contract party of Armenia],” wrote News.am.

On April 28, the Russian state consumer watchdog Rospotrebnadzor indeed initiated the temporary ban on Jemruk – Armenia’s most famous brand of mineral water. A senior Russian official, Revaz Yusupo, cited the need to “prevent possible harm to the life and health of Russian citizens.” Jermuk Group did not immediately comment on the development.

Sources:
Armenia records strong tourism growth in early 2026

Armenia recorded a sharp rise in tourism in the first quarter of the year, with 453 138 visitors — up 18,2% year-on-year, Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan said. “This marks an increase of 18,2%, or over 70 000 tourists, compared to the same timeframe last year,” Papoyan highlighted in a video shared on his Facebook page. As Caucasus Watch noted, the increase marks the highest first-quarter figure on record.

The surge comes alongside steady growth in air travel. Passenger traffic at Zvartnots and Shirak airports exceeded 5,3 million between January and November 2025. Zvartnots accounted for over 5.18 million passengers, while Shirak handled just over 127.000. Overall traffic rose by 7,3% compared to the same period in 2024, reflecting continued recovery and expansion in Armenia’s travel sector.

Recently, Lusine Gevorgyan, the head of the Tourism Committee, mentioned that in the next five years the country anticipates welcoming an annual influx equivalent to Armenia’s population—at least 3 million visitors—and that, in a decade, this figure could soar to 5 million.

Sources:

Azerbaijan

Shutterstock.com

Moscow to pay Baku compensation for downed plane

In April, the dynamics of the development of relations between Moscow and Baku were shaped by the repercussions of the incident in which Russia shot down an Azerbaijani civilian plane in December 2024. On April 13, a court in Yekaterinburg sentenced Shahin Shykhlinski, the head of the Azerbaijani diaspora in the Urals, to nine years in a maximum-security prison for using violence against a law enforcement officer. Shykhlinski was sentenced to 22 years in early March — the first four to be served in prison, the remainder in a maximum-security colony — on charges of murder and attempted murder committed in 2001 and 2011. Combined with the new sentence, he will serve a total of 24 years.

Members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in the Urals were arrested against the backdrop of a crisis in Russian-Azerbaijani relations that erupted after an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger jet crashed near Aktau, Kazakhstan, in December 2024, due to Russian air defence fire.

In March, a court tried a case involving the murders and attempted murders of businesspeople between 2001 and 2011, in which six members of the Azerbaijani diaspora in the Urals and their leader, Shahin Shykhlinski, were charged. The court sentenced the defendants to terms ranging from 10 to 22 years in prison.

Later, on April 22, Azerbaijan sentenced Russian national Aleksandr Vaisero to four years in prison on charges of laundering over 700.000 AZN (420.000 USD). The 36-year-old IT specialist was detained alongside other Russian nationals at the height of diplomatic tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia in June 2025.

Meanwhile, Russia and Azerbaijan’s foreign ministries issued a joint statement regarding the December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines tragedy, confirming that an agreement has been reached and that all outstanding issues are now resolved, including Russia’s payment of compensation to the victims in Azerbaijan. According to the official statement, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia reached a settlement following a meeting in Tajikistan on October 9, 2025.

The statement notes that the bilateral relations “will continue to contribute to strengthening good-neighbourly relations and expanding cooperation in the interests of the peoples of the two countries.”

On December 25 2024, 38 people died, and 29 others were injured when Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8432 crashed near Aktau in Kazakhstan when a Russian missile targeted and struck close to the aircraft mid-flight, causing critical damage next to the Russian city of Grozny.

Sources:
  •  Meduza, “Russian court extends Azerbaijani diaspora leader’s prison term to 24 years”, https://meduza.io/en/news/2026/04/13/russian-court-extends-azerbaijani-diaspora-leader-s-prison-term-to-24-years
  • FARHADOVA Aytan, OC Media, “Baku sentences Russian national detained at height of Azerbaijan–Russia tensions”, https://oc-media.org/baku-sentences-russian-national-detained-at-height-of-azerbaijan-russia-tensions/
  • ALIYEVA Esmira, Euronews, “Russia agrees to pay compensation to Azerbaijan over 2024 airliner tragedy”, https://www.euronews.com/2026/04/16/russia-agrees-to-pay-compensation-to-azerbaijan-over-2024-airliner-tragedy
Armenia and Azerbaijan open up to trade

Official statistics confirm that economic contact between Armenia and Azerbaijan has begun — modest in scale, but among the first publicly documented signs of cross-border trade in years, reports Euronews. Customs data from Azerbaijan shows exports to Armenia reached approximately 5.75 million USD (5.1m AZM) in the first quarter of 2026. No corresponding Armenian customs data has been publicly released for the same period, meaning the available picture reflects only one side of the ledger.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijani media, citing the State Customs Committee, reported that Azerbaijan had imported goods worth 960 USD from Armenia in March, marking the first such instance.

Armenia’s State Revenue Committee (SRC) has denied reports. “Responding to information circulated in the media, we inform that, according to the customs statistics of the State Revenue Committee of Armenia, no cases of exports from Armenia to Azerbaijan have been recorded by customs authorities,” the SRC said.

After a roughly 35-year pause, on December 19, 2025, a train of 22 wagons carrying 1,218 tons of A95 gasoline arrived in Armenia’s Ayrum station in the Tavush region via Georgia from Azerbaijan.

Sources:

Photo: Shutterstock.com

Satellite imagery suggests Stepanakert’s main church was destroyed by Azerbaijan

The cathedral of the largest city in Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh region has been demolished, RFE/RL can confirm through satellite imagery made on April 26. Reports that the Holy Mother of God Cathedral in Khankendi (arm. Stepanakert) had been destroyed emerged in Armenian media in mid-April, but no clear recent imagery showing the site was available until late April.

Construction of the cathedral in Khankendi began in 2006, and the site was consecrated in 2019. As well as serving as the city’s main site of worship, its basement was repurposed as a bomb shelter during the conflicts with Azerbaijani forces that broke out in the 2020s.

Along with the cathedral, imagery sourced by RFE/RL confirms the Church of St. Jacob, another major Christian site in the city, has also been erased in recent weeks. Elnare Akimova, a member of Azerbaijan’s parliament, told RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani service on April 22 that claims of the churches’ destruction are “a provocation by revanchist forces” to harm Baku’s image. Akimova further claimed that her country “has preserved religious and historic monuments on its territories as a state policy. It has never had any intention to destroy any religious heritage.”

On April 27, Azerbaijan’s government-controlled Islamic religious body confirmed and defended the destruction of the cathedral. It claimed that the Azerbaijani authorities had “both legal and moral grounds” for tearing them down. “The demolition of two illegal buildings constructed during the [Armenian] occupation cannot be considered a destruction of religious or cultural heritage,” it said in a statement. “Formerly displaced persons returning to their homeland have repeatedly appealed to the [Azerbaijani] state and judicial bodies, demanding their dismantling.”

Sources:
EU lifts sanctions on five Azerbaijani-owned ships

Five Azerbaijani-owned tankers were removed from the ​European Union’s 20th sanctions package in late April. In a statement, ASCO said the decision was reached after coordination with the Azerbaijani president’s office, the foreign ministry, the state energy company SOCAR, and other bodies. “The decision is considered the result of an objective ​approach grounded ​in international law and constructive dialogue,” ASCO said. The ​company said it would “continue ​to operate in strict compliance with national legislation, international legal norms ​and international ​sanctions regimes.”

At the same time, the EU has included the Azerbaijani Yelo Bank on its newest list of Russia-related sanctions. According to an EU press release, Yelo Bank was sanctioned over its assistance to Russia in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine “by materially obstructing sanctions compliance or by connecting to the Russian Financial Messaging System (FMS), the Russian banking messaging network”.

Yelo Bank, formerly known as Nikoil Bank, has operated in Azerbaijan since the early 2000s. According to reporting by Azertac, the bank “was a subsidiary of the transnational finance and oil corporations NIKOIL Investment Banks Group and the LUKOIL Oil Company. Uralsib Financial Corporation and ISR Holding are also among its stockholders”.

A Yelo Bank statement published by the pro-government media outlet APA emphasised that the bank continues to follow “the sanctions regimes of the US Department of the Treasury (OFAC), the EU, and the UN, as well as international standards and local requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing”.

The bank did not disclose its beneficiaries’ names in its 2025 annual report.

Sources:

Georgia

Shutterstock.com

Another reshuffle in the Georgian government

On April 22, the Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze announced another cabinet reshuffle, with Interior Minister Gela Geladze moving to head the State Security Service (SSG), whose former chief, Mamuka Mdinaradze, will become Deputy Prime Minister and move to a newly created ministerial position for the Coordination of Law Enforcement Agencies. Under the adopted legislation, Mdinaradze’s post will not have a separate administrative apparatus; its functions will instead be carried out by the government administration, which will provide what the law describes as “material-technical” and “organisational” support.

Commenting on the changes, Tbilisi Mayor and Secretary General of the ruling Georgian Dream party, Kakha Kaladze, said that the new ministerial post was created to “improve coordination” between the Interior Ministry and the SSG. “The reshuffle is not being carried out because of any problems or issues related to specific officials”, he added.

Geladze has been serving as Interior Minister since May 2025. Prior to that, he was Deputy Minister of Education from 2023 to 2024. Tamazashvili, his successor, has led the Government of Adjara since April 2025. He succeeded long-time chair Tornike Rizhvadze, who resigned from the post and was hospitalised with a serious gunshot wound three months later. Authorities have claimed that Rizhvadze attempted to take his own life.

Before his appointment in Adjara, Tamazashvili served as Director of the Tbilisi Police Department between 2021 and 2025. Prior to that, he headed the police forces of the Imereti, Racha-Lechkhumi, and Kvemo Svaneti regions.

Following the appointment of a new Interior Minister in Georgia, all five deputy ministers have been officially relieved of their duties. The decision was formalised by a decree signed by Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze. It is currently unclear whether the dismissal of the deputies is a purely procedural step or whether Tamazashvili will reappoint the same officials or bring in new figures to the ministry leadership.

Sources:
The Georgian government is trying to seize the momentum in its relationship with Washington

On March 30, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke with Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze. According to State Department Deputy Spokesperson Tommy Pigott, the two leaders discussed areas of mutual interest, including security in the Caucasus and the Black Sea region. According to the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, Shalva Papuashvili, Kobakhidze–Rubio call signalled that relations between Washington and Tbilisi have reached the highest political level. According to Papuashvili, the Georgian government expected a reset in relations with the US in April.

Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze and other Georgian Dream members went even further, claiming that a US delegation would soon visit Georgia. The US Embassy to Georgia later denied these claims. Despite the call between Rubio and Kobakhidze, American President Donald Trump signed a continuation of earlier sanctions that included measures against Bidzina Ivanishvili.

In late April, Georgia’s ruling party once again claimed positive trends in the currently deteriorating relations with the US, placing particular emphasis on planned developments they say will occur in May. Meanwhile, the Trump Organisation, a real estate conglomerate founded by US President Donald Trump and managed by his family, announced plans to build Trump Tower in Tbilisi. The project, an approximately 70-storey skyscraper, is set to become Georgia’s tallest building, overlooking Tbilisi’s Central Park, which is currently under construction, and bring together “luxury residences, high-end retail, world-class dining, and thoughtfully curated lifestyle amenities.”

The project is designed by California-based Gensler, with local partners including Biograpi Living, Archi Group, Finvest Georgia, and Blox Group. Another partner is the New York–based Sapir Organisation.

Former National Bank Governor Roman Gotsiridze argued that the revival of the Trump Tower project has political motives, claiming it reflects an attempt by Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili to gain favour with Donald Trump. He does not believe this attempt will succeed, however. „Pro-government businesspeople are forming a consortium on Ivanishvili’s orders to build a Trump-branded skyscraper in Tbilisi. It’s too late. Trump needed this project when he was pushed out of Batumi — now even a single gifted aeroplane from the Emir of Qatar would be worth five such towers. Nothing will help Ivanishvili or his loyal business elites escape sanctions“, Gotsiridze said as cited by OC Media.

In November 2024, the United States suspended its multi-year strategic partnership with Georgia. The State Department announced this decision on November 30, 2024, after the Georgian Dream government voted two days earlier to remove the opening of EU accession negotiations from the agenda until the end of 2028.

Sources:
Ilham Aliyev Visits Georgia, Meets Ivanishvili

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited Georgia on April 6, in a trip that came a day after critical journalist Afgan Sadigov was deported to Azerbaijan. Human rights lawyers representing Sadygov linked his deportation to Aliyev’s visit, designed to curry favour with the Azerbaijani leader. “The vassals [the Georgian Dream government] presented him [Aliyev] with gifts and handed him over as a prisoner,” wrote lawyer Tamta Mikeladze.

Aliyev, who arrived with his wife and the state ministers, met with Georgian Dream government officials as well as the ruling party’s founder and Honorary Chairman, Bidzina Ivanishvili, reported civil.ge. The one-day visit concluded with Ivanishvili, who holds no government position, hosting Aliyev and his delegation at a luncheon at the Business Centre in Tbilisi. Several key Georgian Dream officials attended, including Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Economy Minister Mariam Kvrivishvili, and Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili, as well as Government Administration Head Levan Zhorzholiani, and Georgia’s ambassador to Azerbaijan, Zurab Pataradze. The party also released footage of the meeting on its Facebook page, which contains no audio aside from background music.

Georgian social media quickly filled with sarcastic clips portraying Kobakhidze as a sidelined figure once Ivanishvili entered the room. Critics seized on the imagery as yet another reminder of where real power lies, wrote Eurasianet.org.

According to official information, the main aim of Ilham Aliyev’s visit was to deepen the strategic partnership between Georgia and Azerbaijan, particularly in energy, transit and regional security. For many observers, the exchange felt routine and conspicuously avoided sensitive issues, such as the Georgian government’s exclusion from regional talks. Just a month ago, US Vice President JD Vance spent three days in the region, stopping in Yerevan and Baku but bypassing Tbilisi. In addition, the Azerbaijani state-controlled media has recently accused Tbilisi of obstructing Azerbaijani trade. Some reports suggest Georgian officials are worried that TRIPP’s development could have a substantial, negative impact on the Georgian economy.

What was actually agreed upon, if anything, behind closed doors remains unclear, writes Eurasianet.org.

Meanwhile, on April 3, Georgian authorities greenlighted the seizure of residential properties from several households for the construction of the Heydar Aliyev Cultural Centre. The order, signed by Economy Minister Mariam Kvrivishvili, described the centre as a project of “pressing social needs”. The centre is planned to succeed the Heydar Aliyev Tbilisi Azerbaijani State Drama Theatre, located in old Tbilisi. The order stated that its existing space is insufficient for the organisation’s activities, and the building itself is in a deteriorated condition.

Accordingly, the governments of Azerbaijan and Georgia decided to construct a new building on the same street, slightly further along, and a foundation-laying ceremony was held in October 2023. However, it later emerged that “the land plots were not sufficient for the construction”, and the two governments decided to expand the construction site by adding two more plots. The order further noted that the project is to be implemented with Azerbaijani funding, and Georgia’s participation in the ‘multi-million investment’ consists of the buyout of one of the additional land plots by a Tbilisi-registered state-owned company.

Sources:

Photo: Shutterstock.com

Chinese-linked Basisbank acquires Georgia’s Liberty Bank

Georgia’s BasisBank, owned by Chinese conglomerate Hualing Group, has acquired a 95,99% ​ownership stake in Liberty Bank, the ‌South Caucasus country’s third-largest lender, BasisBank said on April 15. Liberty Bank is Georgia’s third-largest bank by assets, with a 5,5% market share as of June 2025. “Through this transaction, we are strengthening competition in the market while delivering greater ​value to our customers,” David Tsaava, general ​director of BasisBank, said in a statement.

Hualing Group, based in ‌China’s Xinjiang region, has snapped up several banking assets in Georgia in recent years. It bought a controlling stake in BasisBank in ​2012 and ​purchased Société Générale’s controlling stake in Bank Republic in 2016.

Liberty Bank was co-owned and sold by businessman Irakli Rukhadze, a figure closely linked to the ruling Georgian Dream party. The sale appears part of a broader divestment strategy: just last month, Rukhadze sold the pro-government TV Imedi shortly before it was sanctioned by the UK, a punitive measure imposed on Tbilisi over its tightening relationship with Russia.

Critics argue the sales are not coincidental. They see a pattern of divesting from assets potentially exposed to international sanctions. Liberty Bank, in particular, carries both economic and political weight. It has long faced criticism for its monopoly of pension disbursements, an arrangement that turned multitudes of socially vulnerable citizens into “eternal” debtors through a high-interest loan scheme.

Former National Bank president and MP Roman Gotsiridze suggested the Liberty Bank sale was driven by fear rather than strategy. “Fearing sanctions, Rukhadze has also withdrawn from Liberty Bank, which has been acquired by BasisBank,” he wrote. “As a result, the pensions and social benefits of more than 1.6 million of our citizens will be distributed by a bank under Chinese control. A Chinese company will have access to the personal data of 42 per cent of Georgia’s population,” said Gotsiridze as cited by Eurasianet.org.

Sources:
Georgia’s ex-Defence Minister Burchuladze sentenced to 10 years in prison

Georgia’s former defence minister, Juansher Burchuladze, was sentenced to ten years in prison after being found guilty of abuse of office and large-scale money laundering. He also had several of his properties confiscated, including a land plot and a house in Malaga, Spain, reported Civil.ge.

Tbilisi City Court Judge Irakli Khuskivadze delivered the verdict on April 23, following unsuccessful defence efforts to reach a plea deal, as Burchuladze did not admit to the charges.

Georgia’s State Security Service (SSG) claimed that Burchaladze, alongside the other defendants, manipulated a ministry procurement deal for medical equipment for his own benefit. It further noted that the item in question was an MRI machine, the price of which was inflated from 2.6 million GEL (970 000 USD) to 3.9 million GEL (1,5 million USD), resulting in a loss of 1.3 million GEL (500 000 USD) from the state budget.

According to the investigation, Burchuladze then concealed his income by purchasing land and a house in Spain for 544 000 GEL (640 000 USD) in January 2025, while concealing the purchase via a fake sale agreement and fictitious loans. The SSG alleged Burchuladze had failed to declare the property in his declaration of assets. Burchuladze did not plead guilty.

Juansher Burchuladze, who served as defence minister from 2021 until February 2024, was arrested on September 11, 2025, amid Georgian Dream’s broader crackdown on former officials, and less than two months after the arrests of his three associates on July 27.

Sources:

  • Civil.ge, “Former Defence Minister Juansher Burchuladze Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison”, https://civil.ge/archives/731692

  • GVADZABIA Mikheil, OC Media, “Georgia’s ex-Defence Minister Burchuladze sentenced to 10 years in prison”, https://oc-media.org/georgias-ex-defence-minister-burchuladze-sentenced-to-10-years-in-prison/

Share This Story, Choose Your Platform!