Between Stability and Escalation: Kosovo Pursues to Enhance Its Security
Dominika Dragúňová
On March 18, 2025, Kosovo, together with Albania and Croatia, signed a joint Declaration on military cooperation. This document has four main objectives – cooperation within the military industry, achieving military interoperability, countering hybrid threats and supporting Kosovar integration into NATO.
Particularly, the latter is crucial for the small West-Balkan state. The public support for becoming a member of the alliance is overwhelmingly high in Kosovo. According to the 2022 Security Barometer by the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, approximately 92 % of all citizens in Kosovo are in favour of joining NATO. This strongly contrasts with the otherwise divided public opinion on key political questions.
This article argues that Kosovo’s security build-up simultaneously accelerates its NATO integration while deepening regional security dilemmas. The aim is to analyse the concrete steps undertaken by the country to enhance its security and, at the same time, to assess the impact these steps have on the region, particularly on relations with Serbia.
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Strategic partnership in times of great global uncertainty
Joining NATO represents a security guarantee for Kosovo. One of the youngest European states declared its independence from Serbia only in 2008 after the Kosovo War in the late 1990s. Despite being almost twenty years after its independence, the country has not yet been officially recognised by Belgrade. The relations between the two countries are still tense, and ad hoc incidents occur on the shared border from time to time.
The last time the situation once again escalated was in 2023. Initially, in April, ethnic Serbs in the north boycotted local elections. Kosovar authorities then attempted to install ethnic Albanian mayors in the region, despite the elections’turnout being only around 3.7 %. As a result, violent clashes between the two sides emerged. On September 24 2023, the situation further escalated when a group of heavily armed ethnic Serb paramilitaries carried out a terrorist attack in the north of Kosovo, resulting in the death of one police officer and three attackers. The Kosovar government accused Belgrade of orchestrating the attack with the aim of annexing the Serb-populated north, a claim which the country denied.
With the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Kosovo became even more cautious over its security situation. As Belgrade has rather warm relations with Moscow and Serbia being the only European country that has not imposed sanctions on Russia, Prishtina watches the conflict very closely.
Russian propaganda is significantly influencing public opinion in Serbia. For instance, disinformation narratives feature mentions that Kosovo is Serbian land. Such narratives do not exist in a vacuum. In a political climate where international law seems to be challenged every day, not only Kosovo but also other Western Balkan countries have grown vigilant. Russian occupation of Ukrainian land sends a signal to the Western Balkan region that if ambiguity among the international community prevails, borders that have once been contested can once again become a source of dispute.
Thus, the importance of regional cooperation lies in an uncertain situation in which the Western Balkan countries find themselves. The unpredictable foreign policy of Donald Trump, together with a long road to the European Union, forces local leaders into action. They look for new partnerships. Some tend to form close ties with authoritarian regimes, such as Turkey or China, whereas others rely on their regional partners. The Joint Declaration on military cooperation can be named as one example.
In other words, the partnership between Kosovo, Albania and Croatia stems from shifting geopolitics. While Albania and Croatia are members of NATO, Kosovo seeks closer integration with the alliance. Albanian journalist and analyst Dritan Ljači also reminds us of their shared values during wars in the former Yugoslavia and their relatively positive current relations.
Reliance on hard power
While military cooperation is undeniably an important aspect of the art of deterrence, Kosovo bets also on another means – on armament. According to Balkan Insight, Prishtina has spent at least 430 million EUR over the past four years to beef up its army. In the year 2024, Kosovo spent 2 % of its GDP on defence. In comparison with other Western Balkan countries, only Serbia invests on a similar scale. On the other hand, both Albania and Croatia invested in the year 2023 around 1,6 % and 1,5 % of their GDPs.
In accordance with the words of the prime minister, Albin Kurti, the plan is to increase the funding. “In the next mandate, we will allocate one billion EUR for our army,“ said Kurti last March. The shift is tangible. Compared to 626 million EUR spent during the past four years, the government wants to boost the investment in defence by 60 %.
Prishtina’s principal arms suppliers are the United States and Turkey. Acting Defence Minister, Ejup Maqedonci, has, for instance, confirmed the purchase of American Puma surveillance drones. Over the past two years, Kosovo has also acquired Javelin anti-tank missile systems. Moreover, the country would like to acquire Black Hawk helicopters. Turkey has supplied Bayraktar combat drones as well as Skydagger loitering munitions. So far, the purchases from Turkey have also included OMTAS and HAR-66 medium-range missiles, as well as platform-mounted machine guns.
Apart from purchasing, Kosovo also began its own arm production. In 2024, Kurti announced the opening of the first state-owned ammunition factory and drone design lab. Furthermore, early this year, the Ministry of Defence confirmed the production of “Shota“. “Shota“ is an armed vehicle designed in Albania. It is designed for high protection against mines and explosions. The decision to move the production to Kosovo is part of the above-mentioned Declaration on military cooperation. As it was stated, the production is intended for the needs of all three countries as well as for further export. For Prishtina, this means a major step forward in terms of deeper integration within the NATO framework. Not only does it strengthen military interoperability, but it also allows Kosovo to gain valuable expertise.
In addition, Kosovo is currently in the second phase of transitioning Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) into a full army of 5,000 troops. KSF was created in 2009 as a primarily crisis-response and ordnance removal force. Meanwhile, the highest military authority in the country is the NATO-led peacekeeping force called the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which was established in 1999. Approximately 4,500 troops are currently deployed under KFOR. However, in 2018, the Kosovar parliament passed a law on transforming the security forces into a regular army. This decision was not taken well in Belgrade.
Belgrade watches vigilantly
The decision to transform KSF, as well as continuous investment in defence, is highly criticised by Serbia. President Vucic has said on multiple occasions that Kosovo was threatening peace in the region by undertaking such steps. He holds the same view on the military cooperation between Kosovo, Albania and Croatia.
Vucic sees this partnership as a possible risk to Serbian security and a sign of Kosovo’s expansive foreign politics. “This is a military alliance. It is created for defence or for offensive actions against certain territories. That defensive alliance can turn into an offensive one in a single day,“ commented the President.
Despite “worrying day and night“, Vucic sends a warning message to its neighbours: “It will be difficult for us, but it will be even more difficult for them.“ Kosovo is thus not the only country in the Western Balkans that is investing in defence. As we have mentioned above, Serbia’s spending represents approximately 2 % of its GDP. Serbia has also purchased Rafale fighter planes from France and weapons systems from Russia and China. There have also been reports about acquiring Iranian drones, the same ones that Russia deploys in the war in Ukraine.
In addition, Serbia is looking for new partnerships too. In April 2025, Belgrade signed a document on military cooperation with Budapest. This step is generally perceived as a reaction to the Declaration on military cooperation between Kosovo, Albania and Croatia and further alignment between the two countries that are ideologically and politically similar. Apart from this, Vucic has recently announced future meetings with political leaders from Turkey, China, Azerbaijan, India and Kazakhstan.
In conclusion, the outcome of Kosovo’s security boosting has two sides. First, by enhancing cooperation with NATO member states, the country is not only strengthening its defence position but also taking one step forward to closer integration with the alliance. On the other hand, partnership with Albania and Croatia, together with further army spending, deepens the mutual distrust with Serbia. Experts warn of a heightened risk of clashes at the border as both countries send warning signals of being prepared for any escalation. The lack of dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade undermines any chance of securing the stability of the region. Moreover, persistent tension only postpones Kosovo’s road into NATO.
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Dominika Dragúňová is an Intern at the Strategic Analysis Young Leaders Programme
Disclaimer: Views presented here are those of the author solely and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Strategic Analysis.
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