Strategic Analysis Caucasus Brief

Review of March 2026

Tomáš Baranec 

Armenia

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Head of Armenian Genocide memorial fired after JD Vance’s visit

The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute Foundation (AGMI) director, Edita Gzoyan, was “urged” by the Government to resign after speaking to the US Vice President JD Vance about the massacre of Armenian citizens in the conflict with Azerbaijan. On March 12, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan confirmed he “instructed” the director of the Armenian Genocide Memorial to resign after she had given US Vice President JD Vance a book on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. In a press briefing, Pashinyan accused Edita Gzoyan of going against his Government’s foreign policy by giving Vance the book. “Giving a foreign guest a book about the Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] issue, what does that mean?” Pashinyan asked, further calling the action “provocative” and “contradicting” his Government’s foreign policy.

“In this country, how many people are capable of conducting foreign policy? […] Any state official in Armenia who makes a statement that contradicts the foreign policy pursued by the Government should be dismissed from their position. What is there to discuss?” Pashinyan continued. He further stated that Armenia is a state, not “some kind of amateur club”.

Reports suggesting that Gzoyan was pressured to resign surfaced since early March, with the tabloid Hraparak reporting that the Education Ministry justified the move by claiming that Gzoyan had not properly supervised ongoing renovations at the Armenian Genocide Memorial Complex. The outlet at the same time underscored that the supervision of the restoration “does not fall within [Gzoyan’s] official responsibilities”.

Gozyan’s dismissal sparked a wave of indignation among parts of Armenian society, with genocide scholars openly condemning her removal. They stressed, according to Armenian Weekly, that Gozyan was „one of the most outstanding and dedicated directors in the history of the institute”, who elevated it to “international academic prominence”. “The sequence of events indicates a broader and deeply troubling pattern: the silencing of independent academic voices in favour of political convenience. There is every reason to believe that this is less about museum administration and more about repositioning AGMI to align its work with geopolitical priorities — especially a desire to avoid honest discussion of atrocities related to Azerbaijan amid ongoing normalisation efforts,” signatories wrote.

According to Civilnet.am, several members of the AGMI Board of Trustees also submitted their resignations in protest, including its Chairman, French-Armenian genocide scholar Raymond Kévorkian. Critics say that the decision represents yet “another manifestation of Pashinyan’s personalist style of governance”. According to several local media, this is not the first time Pashinyan has exceeded his authority to secure the resignation of the heads of independent bodies. One of the most controversial such cases occurred in November 2024, when the Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, Karen Andreasyan, resigned following a text message from Pashinyan.

Pashinyan’s actions and statements are also problematic from the perspective of academic freedom. His claim that Gzoyan’s actions contradict Armenia’s foreign policy does not withstand criticism. In practice, decisions of this kind contribute to creating an environment in Armenia where taboo topics may emerge for scholars working in various fields—topics that are not only discouraged but may also lead to serious consequences if studied or even mentioned. This can undoubtedly be seen as a manifestation of censorship, potentially restricting the space for free debate in Armenia, wrote Civilnet.am.

Sources:

  • BARSEGHYAN Arshaluys, OC Media, “Pashinyan confirms firing genocide memorial head for giving Vance book on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”, https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-confirms-firing-genocide-memorial-head-for-giving-vance-book-on-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/

  • Armenian Weekly, „Genocide scholars condemn removal of AGMI director Edita Gzoyan, https://armenianweekly.com/2026/03/13/genocide-scholars-condemn-removal-of-agmi-director-edita-gzoyan/

  • GRIGORYAN Tigran, Civilnet.am, “Academic Freedom in Armenia at Risk? The Case of Edita Gzoyan”, https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/1009452/academic-freedom-in-armenia-at-risk-the-case-of-edita-gzoyan/

Kocharyan named Armenia Alliance PM candidate for 2026

A ceremonial event of the Armenia Alliance was held on March 16 at the Karen Demirchyan Sports and Concert Complex, where it was announced that Armenia’s second president, Robert Kocharyan, will serve as the Alliance’s candidate for prime minister.

In his speech, Kocharyan said the Alliance’s objective is clear: “We are determined. Our goal is victory,” he said. “The evil embodied by this Government will be defeated. I entered the struggle against them from the very first days they came to power, and I will not rest until they are removed. This is also what distinguishes me from the other candidates for prime minister. But this is not enough. Those responsible for the deaths of thousands of our heroes must be held accountable — those who surrendered Artsakh and who today force the people to forget their heroic history,” Kocharyan said.

Kocharyan is originally from Nagorno-Karabakh, took part in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, and led the region until he moved to Armenia, where he served first as prime minister and then as President from 1998 to 2008. The end of his tenure was marked with a deadly crackdown on a post-election protest on March 1, 2008, in which the opposition insisted that the election results were rigged. In the ensuing crackdown, 10 people were killed, including two police officers.

Aside from the Armenia Alliance, the ruling Civil Contract party’s main opponent in the upcoming election is expected to be the Russian–Armenian tycoon Samvel Karapetyan’s newly formed Strong Armenia party. In addition, tycoon Gagik Tsarukyan, the leader of another opposition group — the Prosperous Armenia party — vowed to build a political “Noah’s Ark”. The former ruling Republican Party and its leader, former president Serzh Sargsyan, ousted during the 2018 Velvet Revolution, have yet to declare whether they will participate in the elections.

Civil Contract, which vowed to secure a constitutional majority in the elections, also warned that the opposition intends to come to power through a coalition formed after the vote, OC Media reports.

Sources:

Photo: Shutterstock.com

The issue of Karabakh Armenians comes to the fore before the elections

In early March 2026, Armenia refused Russian humanitarian aid intended for Nagorno‑Karabakh refugees ahead of the June 7 parliamentary elections. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova confirmed Yerevan’s rejection in her press briefing on March 12 while also expressing Moscow’s puzzlement over the decision. “The justification for Yerevan’s refusal to agree to the next batch of humanitarian aid from Russia for those displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh raises more questions than answers”, Zakharova stated. According to her, it is clear that Yerevan’s refusal to provide exclusively charitable, non-political humanitarian aid stems from the Armenian authorities’ pre-election desire to erase all references to Russia.

Two Russian non-profit organisations — Russian Humanitarian Mission and Eurasia — along with Russian House (Rossotrudnichestvo), were involved in the planned delivery of the aid. As OC media writes, in July 2025, Russia sent more than 140 tonnes of humanitarian aid to displaced Nagorno‑Karabakh Armenians, intended to help about 30,000 people, organised by the same entities.

Swiftly after Zakharova’s statement, the Armenian fact-checking platform FIP reported that Eurasia, founded in Russia in April 2024, was involved in election meddling in Moldova. The members of the organisation’s board of trustees included high-ranking Russian officials and Kremlin propagandists, including Margarita Simonyan, editor-in-chief of RT and FIP, as OC Media also reported. While Armenia has been confronting possible Russian interference in its elections, it also adopted measures to increase salaries and provide bonuses to state servants ahead of the vote, which critics say are tied to winning their support.

Meanwhile, on March 18, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that the housing certificate amount for displaced persons from Karabakh in communities adjacent to Yerevan will be increased from 3 million to 4 million drams (from app. 6.937 EUR to app. 9.250 EUR). The PM explained that this does not apply to Yerevan, as the authorities’ goal is to focus housing programs as much as possible on the regions. Pashinyan also announced that the increase would also apply to those who had already received certificates for 3 million drams. He stated that a decision will be made within one to two months, after which recipients of previously issued certificates will be able to use the updated support amount when purchasing housing.

Armenian Minister of Labour and Social Affairs Arsen Torosyan, in turn, stated that the program would also cover the city of Abovyan in the Kotayk region, home to a large number of displaced persons from Karabakh.

Nevertheless, Pashinyan faced backlash at the end of the month, after calling Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians “runaways” during an argument with a refugee from the region. The argument, which was caught on video and widely shared on social media, took place on the metro while Pashinyan was conducting his Civil Contract “inter-party campaign” in Yerevan. The heated discussion lasted around five minutes and began after Pashinyan asked if he could give a pin with the border of Armenia to a boy with his mother, which they refused. The woman, later identified as Armine Mosiyan, was a refugee from Nagorno-Karabakh. In her rejection of the gift, Mosiyan told Pashinyan that they have a “different map”.

Later, the woman asked Pashinyan to stop arguing with her, explaining that they were on their way to a chess tournament and otherwise would have left the car upon seeing Pashinyan enter. However, Pashinyan said that because he had listened to her arguments, she was obliged to listen to him. After the woman told him not to wag his finger at her and to lower his voice, Pashinyan responded: “Then, next time, do not try to say, you runaways, don’t try to say that I gave away Karabakh”.

Pashinyan’s remarks fueled public outcry online, in what many perceived as a continuation of his Government’s rhetoric targeting Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Criticism became harsher after social media users learned that Mosiyan’s father, Meruzhan Mosiyan, had served as a field commander and been killed in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. After initially denying that he had used the insult, Pashinyan apologised that evening.

Sources:
  •  BARSEGHYAN Arshaluys, OC Media, “Armenia rejects Russian aid for Nagorno-Karabakh refugees ahead of elections”, https://oc-media.org/armenia-rejects-russian-aid-for-nagorno-karabakh-refugees-ahead-of-elections/
  • BARSEGHYAN Arshaluys, OC Media, “Pashinyan calls Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian refugees ‘runaways’ in argument on metro”, https://oc-media.org/pashinyan-calls-nagorno-karabakh-armenian-refugees-runaways-in-argument-on-metro/
  • News.am, “MFA spox: Yerevan refuses Moscow’s help so as to erase references to Russia during pre-election period”, https://news.am/eng/news/935925.html
  • Arka.am, “Housing certificate amount for Artsakh displaced persons in communities near Yerevan will increase to 4 million drams: Pashinyan”, https://arka.am/en/news/politics/housing-certificate-amount-for-artsakh-displaced-persons-in-communities-near-yerevan-will-increase-t/

Papoyan warns of Armenia’s economic risks from US and Israeli operations against Iran

On March 18, Gevorg Papoyan, the Minister of Economy of Armenia, stated that the continuation of the US and Israeli operation against Iran could have long-term negative consequences for Armenia’s economy. He expressed hope that the military developments surrounding Iran would be short-lived, thereby helping minimise the impact on Armenia’s economy. “Even now, the damage is evident. We are seeing rising prices for certain goods, which signals inflationary risks,” the minister stated. “Additionally, Armenia imports raw materials from Iran for the production of some goods, which could further contribute to inflation.”

Papoyan also noted that Armenia maintains significant trade turnover with Iran, including both imports and exports. Therefore, any prolonged conflict could have lasting and adverse effects on the country’s economic stability. Papoyan added that Armenian and Azerbaijani businesses are currently negotiating the supply of a specific product from Armenia to Azerbaijan. He noted that discussions between the two sides are ongoing, but did not disclose further details about the product under consideration.

Sources:

Azerbaijan

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Nakhchivan loses autonomy in new constitutional amendments

On March 10, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev approved amendments to the constitution of the exclave of Nakhchivan, drastically curtailing the region’s autonomy and allowing him further control over its administration. With these amendments, an “authorised representation” of Azerbaijan’s President would be established as an executive power in the region. Azerbaijan’s President will also be allowed to appoint or dismiss local representatives in the region, who will now report directly to Baku. Additionally, the Government of Nakhchivan will no longer report to the region’s parliament, or Supreme Assembly, and instead will coordinate its work with the President of Azerbaijan.

Human rights lawyer Yalchin Imanov told OC Media that these changes were intended to expand the central Government’s powers over the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. “They are intended to minimise — or limit — the powers of the Supreme Assembly of Nakhchivan and its speaker. This effectively reduces the autonomy of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic to zero and contradicts the principles of its sovereignty”, Imanov said. Imanov stressed that the amendments aimed at empowering the President’s office in contradiction to “counter-centralisation” principles used “in normal democratic countries”. “These amendments demonstrate that the Azerbaijani authorities are interested in concentrating all power in the hands of one person – the President”.

Nakhchivan’s autonomy is anchored in historical treaties and enshrined in Azerbaijan’s constitution. Under the 1921 Treaty of Kars, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is recognised as an integral part of the Republic of Azerbaijan with a special status. In recent months, the Azerbaijani authorities have carried out constitutional reforms in Nakhchivan. The Milli Majlis has approved a series of significant amendments to the constitution of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. These changes redistribute the powers of the autonomous institutions and integrate Nakhchivan more closely into Azerbaijan’s unified legal framework.

Paul Goble believes that, based on given administrative changes, Nakhchivan itself will not play any direct role in talks about the development of the Trump road for international peace and prosperity (TRIPP) through the Zengezur/Syunik corridor, and that instead, Baku will be the only player on the Azerbaijani side.

Sources:
  •  FARHADOVA Aytan, OC Media, „Nakhchivan loses autonomy in new constitutional amendments”, https://oc-media.org/nakhchivan-loses-autonomy-in-new-constitutional-amendments/
  • JAM News, „Why governance changes in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan matter”, https://jam-news.net/why-governance-changes-in-azerbaijans-nakhchivan-matter/
  • GOBLE Paul, Eurasia Review, “Azerbaijan’s Aliyev Takes Complete Control Over Nakhchivan Government – OpEd”, https://www.eurasiareview.com/19032026-azerbaijans-aliyev-takes-complete-control-over-nakhchivan-government-oped/
Azerbaijan provides humanitarian aid to Iran

In March 2026, Baku provided two humanitarian aid shipments to Iran amid the ongoing US-Israeli attack. The first shipment was ordered by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on March 10. According to the Azerbaijani state news agency APA, the shipment included 10 tons of flour, approximately 2 tons of medicine and medical supplies, and other humanitarian goods. “The humanitarian aid sent to the Islamic Republic of Iran by vehicles of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Emergency Situations includes 10 tons of flour, 6 tons of rice, 2.4 tons of sugar, more than 4 tons of water, about 600 kg of tea, and about 2 tons of medicines and medical supplies,” the agency stated.

Azerbaijan dispatched the second batch of humanitarian aid to Iran, totalling 82 tons, on March 18. The shipment included 76 tons of food products, 4 tons of medicines, and 2 tons of medical supplies. In light of the Novruz holiday, the aid package also contained festive gifts and traditional items. Officials from Azerbaijan’s Cabinet of Ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the State Reserves Agency also travelled to Iran to oversee the delivery and official handover of the cargo.

The humanitarian assistance follows a phone conversation between President Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on March 8, which aimed to address the immediate needs of Iran’s population. Speaking to journalists, Iran’s Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Mojtaba Demirchilou, expressed gratitude to the Azerbaijani government and people, noting that the gesture reflects shared cultural values between the two nations, particularly the tradition of mutual support in difficult times.

Sources:
Azerbaijan introduces draft laws to regulate AI-generated content

The Azerbaijani Parliament has approved a new bill in its first reading aimed at prohibiting the illegal creation and distribution of materials generated via AI. This is reflected in the proposed new Article 14.1.13-1 of the Law “On Media”. The proposed legislation introduces significant fines and criminal penalties for those found guilty of producing deceptive digital content. Specifically, it prohibits creating photos, videos, or audio materials that do not reflect reality using AI technologies and specialised software by utilising a person’s image or voice without their explicit consent.

Violations will be punishable by fines ranging from 3,000 to 7,000 manats (app. 1.538-3.590 EUR), community service, or imprisonment for up to three years. Stricter punishments are outlined for offences involving blackmail or pornographic content, with imprisonment terms ranging from three to seven years. Additionally, the bill mandates that any AI-generated content displayed publicly must be clearly labelled to indicate its origin.

Sources:

Georgia

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New organised crime and corruption cases

On March 17, Georgian security services arrested 72 individuals in the Adjara region during a crackdown on the criminal underworld, the so-called “thieves’ world”. Interior Minister Geka Geladze said five additional individuals were charged, some already in penitentiary institutions and others in absentia, including a so-called “thiefs-in-law,” a term used in the post-Soviet space for senior criminal figures.

The detainees face multiple charges, including “membership in the thieves’ world,” supporting its activities, “participation in a thieves’ gathering,” “appealing to a member of the thieves’ world,” and “being a thief-in-law,” the minister said. Subsequent media reports indicated that the operation in the village of Sharabidzeebi, Khelvachauri municipality, resulted in several injuries, including two detainees who reportedly inflicted self-harm.

As Civil.ge reported, the given arrests follow what appears to be a growing crackdown in recent months, including a February operation that resulted in 45 arrests, a December 2025 operation with 49 arrests, and a November 2025 raid in which 34 individuals were detained, and one suspect died.

One day earlier, on March 16, Georgia’s former Deputy Economy Minister Romeo Mikautadze was sentenced to ten years in prison after being found guilty on multiple counts of abuse of office and money laundering. According to media reports, alongside the 10-year prison sentence, Mikautadze’s personal wealth, including his residences in Spain and in Mtskheta, was confiscated, as well as three cars registered in the name of his wife. He was also banned from holding public office for two years.

According to RFE/RL’s Georgian Service, Mikautadze had sought to reach a plea deal after expressing this intention during a previous court hearing. He said he was prepared to admit to “a crime that was never committed” and to compensate for “non-existent damages.” Prosecutors, however, wanted him to admit guilt. The sides ultimately failed to reach a plea agreement. Mikautadze, who has been in pretrial detention since June 2025, did not attend the final hearing. His lawyers plan to appeal the verdict to a higher court.

Sources:

  • Civil.ge, “72 Arrested in Crackdown on ‘Thieves’ World’ in Adjara”, https://civil.ge/archives/725581#:~:text=The%20Ministry%20of%20Internal%20Affairs,a%20March%2017%20press%20briefing

  • Civil.ge, “Ex-Deputy Economy Minister Romeo Mikautadze Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison”, https://civil.ge/archives/725267

SOCAR’s Kulevi terminal in Georgia escapes inclusion in EU sanctions against Russia

The European Union will not include Kulevi Port in Georgia in its 20th package of sanctions against Russia, expected to be adopted shortly, citing “positive commitments” by Georgian authorities and the port operator, State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), in reassessing the initial proposal. The decision was communicated in a letter from EU sanctions envoy David O’Sullivan to Georgian Dream Foreign Minister Maka Botchorishvili, dated March 5 and obtained by RFE/RL’s Georgian Service. It came after initial reports suggested that the Kulevi oil terminal had been included in the EU’s 20th sanctions package against Russia over its alleged role in facilitating Russian oil exports.

“The Kulevi Port located in Georgia was initially proposed for possible inclusion in the 20th sanctions package due to its role in the maritime transport of Russian oil and port calls by shadow fleet tankers,” O’Sullivan wrote to Botchorishvili, adding that the “initial position has been reassessed following the positive commitments that your authorities and the port operator have taken.”       While the Kulevi Oil Terminal and Sea Port have long been owned and operated by SOCAR, the more recently inaugurated Kulevi refinery is owned by Black Sea Petroleum, a company run by Georgian businesswoman Maka Asatiani, writes Civi.lge.

Following reports of its removal from the list, the Chair of the Parliamentary Culture Committee, Georgian Dream MP Giorgi Gabunia, told Rustavi 2 that “Georgia has never been used to circumvent sanctions”. “The public has once again become convinced that Georgia is right in this direction and that Georgia has never been used to circumvent sanctions”, he said, echoing a government line that Georgia was subject to a “campaign of disinformation”. Reports indicating that Kulevi was to be included in the sanctions package emerged in early February. The package aims to further reduce Russian oil revenues. The Georgian Government denounced the move and strongly defended the port, stating it had provided the EU Commission with full information regarding the situation at Kulevi, writes OC Media.

The port became entangled in controversy due to an oil refinery being built nearby. Although the refinery has not yet become operational, between November 2025 and January 2026, it reportedly “produced” and sold 116 million USD worth of petroleum products derived from Russian crude oil. Roman Gotsiridze, former governor of the National Bank of Georgia and an economist, noted that such a scheme would have been impossible without the Kulevi terminal, as an inactive refinery could not have produced any petroleum products.

Sources:
US imposes hefty visa bonds on Georgia

Starting April 2, Georgia will be among 12 new countries whose nationals will be required to post a bond of up to 15,000 USD before receiving B1 or B2 visas for business and tourism in the United States, the US State Department announced on March 18.

The US introduced the visa bond pilot program last year, as part of a temporary final rule (TFR) effective for 12 months from August 20, 2025, until August 5, 2026. Under the pilot program, nationals of designated countries may be required to post a bond of 5,000 USD, 10,000 USD, or 15,000 USD, depending on the applicant’s circumstances, with USD 10,000 as the standard amount. Consular officers may waive the bond requirement in limited cases, such as for travel by US government officials or for urgent humanitarian reasons.

According to the State Department, the bond will be returned to visa recipients who return home in compliance with visa and bond terms or do not travel. The US says the program is necessary to combat illegal overstays.

Georgia’s Foreign Ministry commented on the bond programme, urging “Georgian citizens to strictly comply with US visa regulations and not violate the current visa regime”. As OC Media reminds, the subject of visa liberalisation for Georgians has long been discussed, but little has come to fruition. In 2025, the US House of Representatives passed the MEGOBARI Act, which offered the prospect of easing the difficulties Georgians face when seeking a US visa as a carrot if the ruling Georgian Dream party reversed its democratic backsliding. The specific measures that would impact the visa process were not outlined.

The bill, which has since stalled in the Senate for almost a year, would also impose sanctions and other punitive measures against Georgian Dream if the trend is not reversed.

Sources:

  • Civil.ge, “Georgians Will Be Required to Post Up to $15,000 Bonds for U.S. Tourist, Business Visas”, https://civil.ge/archives/725993

  • BARDOUKA Yousef, OC Media, “US imposes hefty visa bonds on Georgia”, https://oc-media.org/us-imposes-hefty-visa-bonds-on-georgia/

Photo: Shutterstock.com

Patriarch of Georgian Orthodox Church Ilia II dies at 93

Patriarch Ilia II, whose nearly five decades of rule have marked the growing influence of the Georgian Orthodox Church, has died at the age of 93, nearly a day after he was hospitalised amid deteriorating health, Metropolitan Shio Mujiri, Patriarchal locum tenens, announced late on March 17.

The Patriarch died in the Caucasus Medical Centre, a hospital in Tbilisi, where he had spent the past hours in intensive care after being admitted in the early hours with heavy stomach bleeding. The news of his death follows years of declining health, which had reduced his public appearances and services.

“He was an epochal figure. This is a great loss for the Orthodox Church worldwide. I want to extend my condolences to every Georgian, to all of Georgia, our Church, and the entire Christian world,” Metropolitan Shio told journalists gathered at the hospital around 22:45 local time amid reports of the Patriarch’s passing. “Through him, through his labours, God brought Georgia back to the faith,” the cleric said, noting that the Patriarch had died “minutes ago.” Metropolitan Shio, who was named by Ilia II as his locum tenens in 2017, will assume the late Patriarch’s duties before the election of a new Patriarch by an extended church assembly.

Patriarch Ilia II was laid to rest on March 22 at Sioni Cathedral in Tbilisi following an enormous funeral procession that drew thousands of people. The new Catholicos-Patriarch will be elected by a Holy Synod, currently composed of 39 bishops. The selection must occur within two months, and the new Patriarch must receive at least 20 votes from synod members. Ilia II previously named Metropolitan Shio Mujiri to act as the Church’s interim leader, serving until the selection process for the new Patriarch is completed. Mujiri’s present role is widely seen as positioning him as the front-runner to formally succeed Ilia II.

Mujiri is closely associated with Georgian Dream circles. He has frequently appeared at party events and is known to be friendly with Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream’s billionaire impresario. The warm relationship was on display during the funeral ceremonies for Ilia II. Mujiri underwent his theological training in Russia and is viewed by some observers as an advocate for close ties with Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church.

According to Eurasianet.org, observers do not expect major shifts in the Church’s direction, as most senior clerics are seen as broadly aligned with the current Government.

Ilia II led the Georgian Orthodox Church for nearly 50 years, having assumed the patriarchate in late 1977, during the twilight of the Soviet Stagnation Era. Over the subsequent five decades, he became perhaps the most prominent conservative voice in Georgia. Public opinion polls consistently showed that he enjoyed the highest level of trust among public figures, and his interventions in political debates carried weight that few, if any, secular leaders could ignore.

Sources:

  • Civil.ge, “Patriarch Ilia II, Leader of Georgian Orthodox Church, Dies at 93”, https://civil.ge/archives/725614

  • Civil.ge, “Live Blog | Patriarch Ilia II Laid to Rest at Tbilisi’s Sioni Cathedral”, https://civil.ge/archives/726382

  • Eurasianet.org, “Georgia mourns Patriarch Ilia II as succession process begins”, https://eurasianet.org/georgia-mourns-patriarch-ilia-ii-as-succession-process-begins

Georgia’s 2025 GDP grows by 7.5% as the IT sector soars

Georgia’s National Statistics Bureau, Geostat, said the country’s GDP grew by 7.5% in 2025, with the IT sector leading and agriculture recording the biggest dip, OC Media reported. The report said Georgia’s GDP grew to 38 billion USD, up from 34 billion USD the previous year.

The IT sector led the growth rate, rising by 29%. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing recorded the sharpest decline, from 13.5% growth in 2024 to 5.7% in 2025. However, while the IT sector appears to have experienced the highest growth rate, its contribution to GDP ranked only fourth at 8%. Touching on the celebrated growth of the IT sector, former MP and former President of the National Bank of Georgia, Roman Gotsiridze, claimed to OC Media today that “one-third of the GDP growth comes from the Russian factor”. “This includes cars being repaired here and then exported to Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere. As for the income of Russian IT specialists, only a small portion remains here because of the tax regime, he said, adding that it is ‘a preferential tax regime,” he claimed.

Regarding the drop in Agriculture, the Galt & Taggart study on the agricultural sector highlighted that, due to fragmented land ownership and the low level of corporatisation in the sector, productivity per hectare in the country is significantly lower than both the world average and the regional averages. In Georgia, fruit yield per hectare is 4.8 tonnes, while in Russia it reaches 10 tonnes per hectare, in Ukraine 11 tonnes, in Armenia 11.4 tonnes, and the EU average is 11.7 tonnes.

Moreover, according to a preliminary report from the Geostat, the volume of foreign direct investment in Georgia in 2025 amounted to USD 1.688,7 million, a 7.6% increase from the revised 2024 figure. The agency claims this increase is due to growth in two components of foreign direct investment: equity capital and reinvestment.

Sources:
  •  BEDWELL Helena, OC Media, “Georgia’s 2025 GDP grows by 7.5% as IT sector soars”, https://oc-media.org/georgias-2025-gdp-grows-by-7-5-as-it-sector-soars/
  • Caucasus Watch, “Investments in Georgia on the Rise”, https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/investments-in-georgia-on-the-rise.html

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