Media Capture and Disinformation during Serbia’s Protests

Zuzana Šmilňáková

For a year now, thousands of people across Serbia have joined anti-corruption protests and blockades led by students. Citizens are demanding justice for those responsible for the tragic death of 16 people killed by the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad on  November 1, 2024. Serbia has witnessed what is believed to be the largest protest in its history, when more than 300,000 people took to the streets on March 15, 2025, to demand justice.

University blockades, silent sit-ins held at the symbolic time of 11:52, when the canopy collapsed, and numerous strikes are just some of the actions citizens have undertaken to honour the victims and press for their demands. Protesters have repeatedly faced violent police crackdowns, arrests, and beatings, prompting UN human rights experts to call on the Serbian Government to immediately end the violence against its citizens. The European Parliament also spoke out against state repression and adopted a resolution condemning it.

Police brutality on the streets was not the only way protesters were targeted. For months, they have also faced a constant wave of disinformation and propaganda. This article examines the most frequent disinformation narratives circulated about the protests during their first year. The narratives analysed here were identified as the most prevalent, although some less widespread ones may have been omitted. The article outlines the main actors who fabricate, spread, and amplify these narratives and explores their role within Serbia’s media ecosystem. In preparation for this analysis, the author spent two weeks in Serbia and interviewed several protesters in both Belgrade and Novi Sad.

The protest movement, which has so far mobilised large segments of the Serbian population, emerged in response to the tragic death of 16 people killed by the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1, 2024. At 11:52 that day, the concrete structure fell on people walking beneath it. Fourteen victims were killed instantly, while three others were seriously injured. Two later succumbed to their injuries in the hospital.

In the aftermath of the tragedy, citizens began accusing state authorities of negligence during the earlier reconstruction of the canopy. In the days that followed, several spontaneous protests took place in both Novi Sad and Belgrade. Demonstrators demanded the resignation and arrest of officials they held responsible for the deaths in Novi Sad. Eventually, local protesters joined the broader national movement that went on to organise some of the largest mobilisations in the country’s history.

„Citizens are demanding justice for those responsible for the tragic death of 16 people killed by the collapse of the railway station canopy in Novi Sad on  November 1, 2024.“

Photo: Shutterstock.com

Media environment in Serbia

Serbia suffers from a serious lack of media pluralism. This situation stems from a weak regulatory framework for the media and an extensive web of clientelist relations between the state and privately owned outlets. Since coming to power, President Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party have consolidated control over major media conglomerates in the country, mirroring the tactics of Viktor Orbán in neighbouring Hungary during his rise to power.

The most visited online outlets in Serbia belong to the tabloid category, using sensationalist language and striking visuals to spread manipulative content or outright disinformation narratives. Websites such as Alo, Kurir, Blic, and Informer form a self-reinforcing network that both generates and disseminates these narratives, alongside pro-government television channels like Pink and Happy.

In addition to local producers of disinformation, Serbia also hosts Russian state-owned media such as Russia Today and Sputnik, both of which are banned in the European Union. Employees of these outlets are frequently presented as “analysts” and invited to share their opinions in tabloids and government-aligned TV programs.

„Serbia also hosts Russian state-owned media such as Russia Today and Sputnik, both of which are banned in the European Union. Employees of these outlets are frequently presented as “analysts” and invited to share their opinions in tabloids and government-aligned TV programs.“
„Protesters were accused of being paid foreign agents seeking to stage a coup on behalf of various outside groups.“

Frequent accusations against the protesters

By far the most widespread narratives surrounding the protests portrayed them as a foreign-led attempt to destabilise Serbia. Protesters were accused of being paid foreign agents seeking to stage a coup on behalf of various outside groups. Tabloid media and government figures repeatedly evoked the imagery of the Ukrainian Maidan uprising. In pro-Russian disinformation narratives, the 2014 popular uprising against the Government of Viktor Yanukovych is frequently depicted as a coup backed by “the West.” As a result, Maidan has become a commonly used buzzword conveying the idea of a foreign threat.

Furthermore, officials from the Serbian Progressive Party, including Ana Brnabić, described the protests as “an attempt at a Colour Revolution” in Serbia, reviving another disinformation trope that questions the legitimacy of the so-called Colour Revolutions, which sought to establish democratic regimes in post-socialist countries. The front pages of tabloid newspapers consistently feature images from the protests with headlines depicting demonstrators as violent and presenting them as a threat to “orderly Serbia.”

Many of these narratives borrowed familiar motifs from abroad, accusing protesters, for example, of being “foreign agents” funded by USAID. However, a distinct localised narrative also emerged in Serbia, in which the Government alleged that the protesters had been infiltrated by Croatian secret security services tasked with destabilising the country and securing the Vojvodina region.

Photo: Shutterstock.com

Ćaciland – “Students who wants to learn“

In March 2025, just a few days before the largest protest in Serbia’s modern history, a tent camp appeared in front of the National Assembly in Pionirski Park. The people in the encampment posed with pro-government messages and called themselves “students who want to study” or “Students 2.0.” In their statements to local media and television, these “students” called for an end to school and university blockades and a return to classes, accusing the protesters of disrupting their studies. They openly expressed support for the ruling Serbian Progressive Party and President Aleksandar Vučić.

According to those who participated in the blockades, most of the people in the tent camp did not appear to be students, as many were significantly older. Journalists were able to identify several of them from photos and videos circulating on social media. Many turned out to be employees of state institutions or party activists closely tied to the ruling party.

While attempting to present themselves as a genuine student counter-protest group, their main spokesperson was an actual student of the Faculty of Medicine, Miloš Pavlović. Frequently photographed alongside Vučić and even former Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, Pavlović expressed support for the ruling Government and accused student blockades of spreading hatred within Serbian society. He has been repeatedly featured in pro-government tabloids and television channels and has also given statements to the Russian state-owned outlet Russia Today.

Participants in the counter-protest camp were labelled “ćaci” by protesters on social media, and their camp in Pionirski Park became known as “Ćaciland.” The term originated at a secondary school in Novi Sad, where students also joined the school blockade. As a response, graffiti appeared in front of the school with a misspelt slogan, instead of “đaci u školu” (“students, go to school”), it read “ćaci u školu.” The mistake quickly spread across social media, where protesters mocked it as the work of an uneducated government supporter. However, figures from the counter-protest movement soon embraced the term “ćaci,” and even the President publicly declared himself to be one.

„Participants in the counter-protest camp were labelled “ćaci” by protesters on social media, and their camp in Pionirski Park became known as “Ćaciland.”
„Almost every faculty runs its own social media account, where students post updates, announce upcoming protests, and share their demands toward the Government.“

Response of the protesters

From the outset, students involved in the blockades and protests communicated in a decentralised manner, reflecting their horizontal organisational structures. Almost every faculty runs its own social media account, where students post updates, announce upcoming protests, and share their demands toward the Government. This approach allows organisers to bypass the country’s media ecosystem, which has systematically portrayed them in a negative light, apart from a few truly independent newsrooms.

Students marched hundreds of kilometres through villages across Serbia to spread their message. Through this direct form of communication, they sought to counter the negative narratives pushed by tabloid media. They also started the campaign “Student u svakom selu” (A Student in Every Village), which sent students to rural areas to speak directly with local residents about their demands toward the Government.

In April 2025, students blockaded public broadcasters, claiming that national media outlets were not covering the protests and were deliberately ignoring them. They blocked the entrances to the headquarters and studios of Radio Television of Serbia (RTS) in Belgrade and Radio Television of Vojvodina (RTV) in Novi Sad. Moreover, they demanded a new selection process for the members of the Council of the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media (REM), an institution long stained by scandals and a lack of transparency.

Photo: Shutterstock.com

Conclusion

This article illustrated how the Government of Serbia attempts to delegitimise the ongoing student blockades and anti-corruption protests. Similar tactics are frequently utilised by governments that lose legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. The Serbian case, however, offers an outlook on strategies that can be employed by the protesters to reclaim their narrative in a heavily controlled information environment. The ongoing protests demonstrate how social movements engage in digital activism to counter their negative image, even in a society with a lack of media pluralism. Given Serbia’s ongoing accession process to the EU, it is imperative that the media landscape transforms into a more democratic space. The initiatives, such as „A student in every village“, might help in this process as they make the population more aware of the new perspectives outside of those presented on national frequencies and low-quality tabloid media. Currently, the protests in Serbia continue with thousands still demanding justice for the victims of the Novi Sad tragedy.

Zuzana Šmilňáková is an Intern at the Strategic Analysis Young Leaders Programme

Disclaimer: Views presented here are those of the author solely and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Strategic Analysis

Sources:
„The ongoing protests demonstrate how social movements engage in digital activism to counter their negative image, even in a society with a lack of media pluralism.“

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