Security and military presence in the Balkans

Hungary’s involvement in the security architecture of the Western Balkans has become increasingly visible over the past decade. As a NATO and EU member, Hungary positions itself as both a security provider and a political mediator between Western institutions and the non-aligned states of the region. This dual role stems from its geographic position and the perception that instability in the Balkans directly affects Central European security through migration, organised crime, and energy-supply routes. According to the Centre for Fundamental and Western Balkan Studies (CFWBS), Budapest’s policy combines pragmatic regional engagement with the pursuit of strategic influence, often by emphasising bilateral cooperation with certain states rather than a collective Western Balkans approach.

The defence and security partnership between Hungary and Serbia has strengthened significantly, forming a key pillar of Budapest’s engagement in the Western Balkans. In Belgrade on 1 April 2025, Serbia’s Defence Minister Bratislav Gašić and Hungary’s Defence Minister Kristóf Szalay‑Bobrovniczky signed a new bilateral cooperation agreement covering 79 joint military activities scheduled for 2025. The document builds on an earlier 2023 framework and is positioned as moving the relationship toward a quasi-alliance structure, at least the Serbian side would like to see it that way.

From Hungary’s perspective, Serbia represents its most intensive bilateral defence partner among non-EU, non-NATO neighbours, and as Hungary’s defence minister stated “in today’s rapidly changing and uncertain international environment, it is of utmost importance that Serbia and Hungary, as neighboring countries, consult each other continuously and at a high level in order to ensure stability in the region”. In turn, Serbia presents the agreement as its strongest defence tie among neighbouring countries. This agreement must be understood in the context of emerging military alignments and rearmament in the Western Balkans. In March 2025, a trilateral defence declaration was signed by Croatia, Albania and Kosovo, signalling an intensifying security dynamic in the region. Serbia viewed that pact as a provocation and responded by accentuating its cooperation with Hungary. 

Importantly, Hungary has emerged as one of the main Central European contributors to NATO’s KFOR, even holding the command position under Major General Ferenc Kajári in 2021–22. Around 700 Hungarian troops have served in Kosovo, reflecting Budapest’s intent to be seen as a regional security provider. The current rotation, prepared by the Hungarian Air Force, also provides helicopter and reconnaissance support to enhance KFOR mobility. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary remains active in EUFOR Althea, regularly joining the Rapid Response exercises that test the mission’s readiness, where Hungarian reserve forces often cooperate with KFOR units. Through these roles, Hungary maintains a steady operational footprint and leverages its missions to project influence and stability across the Western Balkans.

Nevertheless, Hungary’s growing military footprint has drawn criticism and controversy. In early 2025, the Hungarian Counter-Terrorism Centre (TEK) allegedly prepared a covert operation to evacuate Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, should Bosnian authorities attempt to arrest him. Although the operation was reportedly never executed, the revelation provoked a reaction from Bosnia and Herzegovina, calling for the removal of the Hungarian contingent from the EUFOR mission in the country due to the closeness of the Hungarian officials to Milorad Dodik. Prime Minister Orbán repeatedly hosted Milorad Dodik in Budapest, even amid EU sanctions debates, which underscores their good relations. 

These developments reveal how Hungary’s security engagement in the Western Balkans extends beyond institutional frameworks into the realm of political alignment. For Serbia, a partnership with Hungary provides access to advanced military expertise and a friendly partner within the EU. For Hungary, it consolidates its influence in the region while supporting partners whose policies align with its sovereigntist and stability-first narrative. Yet this approach also risks deepening rifts between Budapest and Brussels, as it increasingly intertwines security cooperation with politically sensitive regional loyalties.

Hungary’s push for Serbia’s EU bid

Hungary serves as Belgrade’s main advocate within the European Union, vigorously promoting Serbia’s accession process. This push relies on framing Western Balkan integration as a necessary move to secure the continent, a position frequently voiced by Foreign Minister Szijjártó. Specifically, Hungary lobbies for the swift opening and closing of negotiation chapters, effectively acting as Serbia’s advocate against member states demanding stricter rule of law adherence. This support includes bilateral efforts on connectivity, such as advancing the „Green Lanes Initiative“ or the Belgrade-Budapest railway. 

Crucially, Hungary use its influence to normalise the Serbian administration’s governance model, thus bypassing critical EU scrutiny of democratic standards. This deep commitment to Serbia’s EU bid stems from a clear national interest calculus. The core benefit is security since Budapest views Serbia as the indispensable first line of defence against irregular migration along the Southern flank, directly linking Belgrade’s border management effectiveness to Hungarian domestic stability. Economically, Hungary secures privileged access and strategic positioning in the Western Balkans, leveraging trade ties and controlling vital transit routes for energy, including the gas pipeline network, as we already mentioned earlier. Ideologically, the alliance is essential, as both governments share a „sovereignty-first“ narrative, cultivating a future aligned member state to foster a reliable counterweight bloc against mainstream liberal consensus and external EU pressures. This advocacy is contrasted sharply by Hungary’s consistent use of its veto power to obstruct Ukraine’s EU accession. Budapest argues that admitting a nation at war would „drag the war“ into the EU and divert critical funds, thereby Hungary leverages the Ukraine conflict to push the Western Balkans, especially Serbia, up the enlargement agenda and reinforce the idea that their candidates are more deserving of progress and they should be first in the process.

For the European Union, however, this close cooperation severely challenges the integrity of the enlargement process. Hungary’s lobbying, which prioritises geopolitical alignment over strict accession criteria, weakens the EU’s ability to use conditionality as a tool for promoting the rule of law and preventing democratic backsliding in Serbia. This approach risks bringing into the Union a member state that could mirror Hungary’s own post-accession democratic decline. As a result, the EU’s stance appears ambiguous, which means, while the European Commission formally upholds merit-based standards, political realities, such as the need to preserve regional stability and limit Russian and Chinese influence, often lead to pragmatic compromises. In essence, the Budapest-Belgrade relations expose a structural contradiction within the enlargement process, where geopolitical priorities can outweigh the consistent application of core democratic principles, complicating the credibility and coherence of the EU’s enlargement policy.