Strategic Analysis Balkan Brief

First half of October 2025

Petra Bošková, Ema Valachová, Dominika Dragúňová, Lea Bellušová, Henrieta Vengrínová, Igor Píš, Terézia Hlačinová

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Albania
AI Women in Politics: Diella as Minister, TirANA as Mayor

In recent years, artificial intelligence has evolved from assisting with simple daily tasks to tackling complex technical and theoretical challenges, increasingly playing a role in areas once reserved for human decision-making.

Diella, the Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, is a woman who appears in traditional Albanian attire every day, except that she isn’t human at all, but a virtually created AI entity. Before she was appointed a Minister, she was featured on the state’s website, e-Albania, where she guided users through the website and provided voice guidance, helping them with bureaucratic tasks. Due to her outstanding performance, she was later appointed Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence on September 11. As Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, Diella is responsible for integrating AI into public administration, improving efficiency, and reducing bureaucracy. Her main task is to oversee public procurement using data-driven algorithms to increase transparency and fight corruption. Decisions about public tenders will be taken out of the hands of ministries and entrusted to Diella, described as the ‘servant of public procurement.’ The process will unfold step by step, but the goal is for Albania to become a country where public tenders are 100% incorruptible and every Euro of public funds is fully traceable.

Following Diella’s appointment as Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, a new phenomenon that bridges technology and politics is increasingly being discussed in Albania. In the upcoming municipal elections, another candidate created by artificial intelligence could therefore run for the position of mayor of Tirana – TirANA (Tirana Algorithmic Neural Assistant). The TirANA project aims to introduce a new type of city leadership based on transparency, efficiency, and accountability. The IT experts behind the TirANA project, Denisa Kele, Tomi Kallanxhi, and Besmir Semanaj, stated in a Facebook post that the city needs a new approach to governance that relies on data and algorithms rather than subjective political decisions. According to Besmir Semanaj, one of the creators, TirANA will be completely open to citizens: “Every citizen has the opportunity to see the code, monitor the data sources, and verify its functionality.”

Artificial intelligence can transform traditional methods of governance and political decision-making, offering benefits such as transparency, efficiency, and accountability, while also posing potential threats and risks associated with automated decision-making and the loss of the human factor.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina to Establish a National CERT Three Years After Major Cyber Incidents

In September 2022, the Sarajevo Assembly suffered a cyberattack that disabled its servers and websites for weeks. Yet, three years later, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to struggle to establish a national Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) for all its institutions. This leaves the state’s critical infrastructure, public and economic services, and citizens´ data security very vulnerable. The absence of CERT was discussed in the European Union, where CERT is considered a standard and has been operating for 15 years. Alongside the EU, international partners and civil society organisations have encouraged Bosnia and Herzegovina to advance the legislative process, allocate resources, and strengthen human capacities.

Two years ago, the government formalised the staffing structure of the Ministry of Security, and a year and a half later assigned office space for the national CERT team. The Ministry of Security says that the funding secured through the United Nations Development Program will be used to equip the premises.

In May 2025, under the EU-Council of Europe CyberSEE Project, Bosnia´s justice institutions and international experts met in Sarajevo to discuss legislation and steps towards implementing the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime. This event advanced legal harmonisation but revealed ongoing institutional gaps and the absence of operational cybersecurity capacity.

On October 9, 2025, the government allocated funds for CERT premises and staffing, but the budget this year remains unapproved due to continuing political negotiations among parties representing different ethnic groups. As a consequence, the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina currently has no funds to hire CERT teams.

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Montenegro
Montenegro’s Democratic Oversight Challenges Amid EU Accession

While at Brdo-Brijuni Process Leaders’ Summit, which was held on October 5,  EU member states Slovenia and Croatia joined six Western Balkan candidates to discuss regional cooperation and the European perspective, and while Brussels promotes enlargement as proof of Europe’s transformative power — and Montenegro reached full SEPA readiness on October 6 — concerns persist over its adherence to democratic principles required for EU membership.

Beyond economic dependence on China’s Belt and Road loans, experts highlight Montenegro’s struggle with democratic oversight of state surveillance. Since the 2020 fall of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), the government has done little to dispel fears over the extent of domestic spying and the lack of accountability.

The ongoing trial of former ANB director Dejan Perunčić, accused of illegally wiretapping the Special State Prosecutor’s Office, remains a key test of institutional integrity. Witnesses reportedly include journalists, activists, and former prosecutors — among them TV Vijesti journalist Petar Komnenić, who recently publicly confirmed he was being watched, and who has questioned whether Perunčić acted without political direction.

Experts warn that Montenegro’s slow pace of reform and politicisation of the security sector, exemplified by the appointment of Ivica Janović — who lacks intelligence or policing experience — as ANB director, undermines trust in institutions.

While the EU Delegation in Podgorica says it is closely monitoring developments in Montenegro’s intelligence framework, analysts note that balancing security needs with citizens’ rights remains a central challenge.

As Montenegro advances toward EU accession, its success will depend not only on technical readiness but also on ensuring transparency, accountability, and democratic control over its security institutions.

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Kosovo
Test for Kurti: Kosovo’s Local Elections Overshadowed by Crisis and Censorship Allegations

Local elections in Kosovo, held on October 12, ended with most municipalities (including Pristina, Prizren, Peja/Pec and South Mitrovica) heading to runoffs, scheduled to be held on November 9. Preliminary turnout was reported at 40%, which was lower than the local elections four years prior. These elections were overshadowed by two main controversies – a prolonged institutional crisis and alleged media censorship.

The institutional crisis was triggered by the parliamentary elections in February 2025. Although Vetëvendosje, the party of acting prime minister Albin Kurti, received the most votes, a parliamentary majority was not formed until recently (October 10). The local elections on October 12 were therefore widely regarded as a “mini referendum” on the support for Vetëvendosje. Opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK), and the Social Democratic Initiative (NISMA), hoped voters would punish Vetëvendosje for their institutional standstill. Kurti’s party did not achieve the decisive victories that would have solidified its mandate, aligning with the hopes of opposition parties. Vetëvendosje won in just three municipalities: Podujeva, Kamenica, and Shtime.

The second controversy involved the Central Election Commission (CEC), which refused to grant accreditation to numerous Serbian, international, as well as Albanian media outlets wanting to cover the polls. The CEC has published a list of rejected media outlets, but without justification. These rejections naturally opened up questions on freedom of the press and transparency. Discussions among some CEC members suggest the reason for these rejections may be “propaganda and slander against Pristina”. The Association of Journalists of Kosovo (AJK) claims that “the refusal looks like a political and ethnic nature”. This CEC decision sparked a strong backlash from NGOs and the international community.

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Serbia
The US Sanctions a Serbian Oil Company with Close Ties to Russia

The United States imposed sanctions on Serbia’s oil company NIS (Oil Industry of Serbia). The cut came into force on October 9 after months of delay. This decision was made as part of an extensive sanction package with an aim to target the Russian energy sector.

Serbia heavily depends on Russian gas and oil supplies, which are then distributed by NIS. Although Belgrade is the owner of almost 30 % of the company’s stakes, NIS is mainly owned by Russian oil giant Gazprom Neft. Around 45 % is in the hands of Russians. The rest belongs to small shareholders.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić warned that sanctions on NIS will have serious political and economic consequences. At the same time, he admitted that he had refused to nationalise the company amid a US request, which eventually led to sanctions coming into force. “I am not a thief,“ the president said.

NIS informed the public that despite this setback, the company has enough reserves to maintain a regular supply to its petrol stations. “Our sales are operating as normal. There are no restrictions when it comes to the quantities customers can purchase,” Bojana Radojevic, NIS retail director, said.

However, customers will no longer be able to pay with foreign payment cards, such as MasterCard or Visa. Due to the US restrictions on NIS, there is a high possibility that foreign payments will not go through. For that reason, only domestic cards or cash are being accepted.

Since the beginning of the full-fledged war in Ukraine in 2022, Belgrade has refused to support Western sanctions on Moscow. Once an eager candidate for EU accession, Serbia has in recent years steadily distanced itself from the prospect of membership, forging warm ties with Russia instead.

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North Macedonia
Between Protest and Reform: What Serbia Could Learn from the Pržino Agreement

For nearly a year, Serbs – especially students have been rallying in cities across the country, demanding fairer courts, honest elections, and for those in power to finally answer for their actions. All of this feels a bit like déjà vu if you remember North Macedonia’s big political crisis in 2015, when leaders came together and hammered out the Pržino Agreement to try to fix things. Now, there’s a real debate in Serbia: could a similar deal actually help us move forward, or is the situation here just too different?

The Pržino Agreement in North Macedonia is a good example of how outside help and compromise can sometimes get a country through a political crisis. Basically, leaders there agreed to bring in a Special Prosecutor to dig into political scandals, formed a temporary government that even included the opposition, and set up rules to make elections feel fair again. What made it work? There were real steps for following through on promises, active citizens pushing for change, and steady backing from the European Union.

But things in Serbia are pretty complicated. The people in charge have a tight grip on power, and bodies that are supposed to keep things in check—like the courts—aren’t really independent. Unlike in North Macedonia, outside groups don’t have much sway here, and the folks running the show are pretty stubborn about making any compromises, mostly because they’re worried about losing control.

If Serbia were to adopt a Pržino-style solution, it couldn’t simply replicate what North Macedonia did. It would have to come up with something that fits its own situation and probably do it step by step. The country would need a truly independent Special Prosecutor to look into abuse claims, someone politicians can’t mess with. Trust in elections can only be restored if there are real, enforceable rules for fair voting. Groups like the EU, the OSCE, and local activists would need to keep an eye on the process. At the same time, big changes would be needed for the courts, the media, and anti-corruption agencies, so these fixes don’t just fade away after a while.

Without those kinds of protections, any new agreement would likely be just a temporary fix. If these changes don’t stick, things could easily revert to their previous state, leaving people frustrated all over again, possibly even more divided than before.

So what’s the best way forward? Leaders from the government, the opposition, and everyday people in Serbia all need to come together and work out a realistic reform plan—maybe borrow some ideas from the Pržino Agreement, but make sure it fits what’s really happening in Serbia. And when it comes to international partners, it’s not enough to just give advice or send observers. They should stick around, help out in practical ways, and make sure their support is tied to real progress. Only then will these reforms have a chance of sticking and making a real difference for democracy in Serbia.

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