Strategic Analysis Balkan Brief

First half of November 2025

Petra Bošková, Ema Valachová, Terézia Hlačinová, Igor Píš, Henrieta Vengrínová, Lea Bellušová, Dominika Dragúňová



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Albania
Albania’s EU Accession in 2025: Opening the Final Negotiation Cluster

„Promises only have meaning when they are kept. We had promised to open all negotiation chapters by 2025.”  words of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Elisa Spiropali came true. The year 2025 represents a major turning point in Albania’s progress toward EU membership. The European Union officially announced that at the 7th Intergovernmental Conference on 17 November, it plans to open the final five negotiation chapters grouped under Cluster 5, which deals with issues as Resources, Agriculture, and Cohesion. This step represents a significant breakthrough, as it marks Albania’s entry into the final phase of technical negotiations, which are a prerequisite for the eventual completion of the entire accession process.

In detail, Cluster 5 covers areas such as agriculture, food safety, regional development, cohesion policy, and natural resource management. These are among the most complex and financially demanding chapters, as they directly affect state aid policy, the ability to absorb EU funds, and the need to harmonize with the EU’s strict technical standards. The opening of this cluster also signals that Brussels recognizes Albania’s progress in previous areas, particularly in judicial reform, the fight against corruption, and the strengthening of public administration. 

Foreign Minister Elisa Spiropali described this moment as “historic,” noting that, in her view, Albania is closer to membership than at any point since the beginning of the entire accession process. Overall, the opening of the final cluster represents a clear signal of political trust from the EU while also creating space for an ambitious, yet challenging, discussion on the final conditions of Albania’s entry into the EU.



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Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Lowest-Performing Student in the EU Enlargement Class

On November 7,  the European Commission presented its annual “Enlargement Report” assessing advancements of all 10 candidate countries that are ultimately moving towards EU accession. The annual report had praised multiple candidates for their improvements, but in terms of Bosnia and Herzegovina the word “improvement” can be found only very marginally. Interestingly enough, local media seemed to widely dismiss this report as a „prototypical non-event“, confirming that the accession has become a “non-process”, leading nowhere.

The EC’s formal assessment noted only a minor increase in BiH’s overall preparedness score for EU membership, moving from 1,67 to 1,7 (Montenegro, for instance, has scored 3,11 out of 5). This placed the country as the lowest-performing candidate in the Western Balkans, scoring even lower than Kosovo (2,11 points). Overall, the report indicated “no tangible reforms and persistently stalled reforms”. 

The reporting period was significantly marked with “severe political tensions and escalation”, mainly driven by Republika Srpska. Milorad Dodik is explicitly named as responsible for the tensions. RS tried to adopt anti-constitutional legislation, which were subsequently repealed by the Constitutional Court. This conflict led to an “increasingly unsatisfactory” standard of governance. Key areas like the Judiciary (chapter 23) and economic preparedness remain at an “early stage of preparedness”, with “No progress was made” in addressing widespread corruption.

Some observers noted that the EU itself is being „passive, reactive, and hesitant,“, mainly because some member states are constrained by politically shielding figures just like Dodik. The conclusion is that without „significant increase in the EU’s engagement, commitment, and pressure“ prospects for genuine integration progress are only very limited.

 

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Montenegro
Montenegro’s big steps to the EU, small steps in freedom of speech online and tackling smuggling

In Montenegro, it is becoming clear that freedom of speech on the internet is regulated inconsistently and often selectively, creating legal uncertainty and opening space for the abuse of power. Although a formal legislative framework exists and the constitution guarantees freedom of speech online, the practical application of the laws is inconsistent, slow, and often dependent on a person’s social status or the sensitivity of the criticism.

One of the issues is selective prosecution. State interventions frequently target journalists and commentators who criticise public officials, while genuinely harmful content—including hate speech and incitement to violence—often remains unaddressed. This situation is compounded by the insufficient professional preparedness of institutions; law enforcement bodies lack the expertise needed to assess the specifics of online communication, and the mechanisms they use are outdated in the context of the digital environment. Monitoring is also problematic, as data from local authorities and police are incomplete and inconsistent, making it impossible to effectively track trends or develop high-quality policies in the field of digital rights.

According to the 2025 Organised Crime Index, produced by an anti-corruption NGO, Western Balkan countries remain important corridors in Europe for drug trafficking, human trafficking and migrant smuggling. The report highlights corruption as one of the main enabling factors and notes that in Montenegro and Serbia, long-standing networks have historically shielded certain groups from law-enforcement actions. In Montenegro and Albania, exploitation is often linked to tourism and nightlife. Although Montenegro is not a central hub for migration flows, its coastline and ports play a key role in other illicit markets, particularly in drug and tobacco smuggling. Most cocaine trafficked from South America passes through the port of Bar in Montenegro and the Albanian port of Durrës before continuing to Western Europe. A small portion remains in the region for local markets.

Despite the mentioned difficulties, Montenegro is successfully progressing towards EU membership. At the beginning of November in Brussels, during the presentation of the European Commission’s annual Enlargement Package, its report on the progress of EU candidate countries—the Report on the progress of EU candidate countries, Marta Kos, stated that Montenegro is the most advanced and has made significant progress toward EU accession, making it the best-prepared country among the candidates. She also noted that Montenegro could be the first among the other praised countries—Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine—to move forward on the path to EU membership.



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Kosovo
Kosovo on the brink of snap elections

After nine months of inability to form a new government, Kosovo faces possible snap elections in December. The general elections were held in February 2025. Previous prime minister, Albin Kurti, and his party Vetevendosje (Self-determination) won with approximately 42 % of the vote. However, ever since then Kurti was unable to reach an agreement with other political parties on a new government. 

Opposition parties –  the Democratic Party of Kosovo, the Democratic League of Kosovo and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo – refuse to govern with Kurti. They criticise his foreign politics towards Western allies and his actions in the northern region of Kosovo, where the Serbian minority lives. On the other hand, the former PM openly states his unwillingness to cooperate with the Serbian minority party, Srpska Lista. 

This political deadlock resulted in a constitutional crisis, as members of parliament could not agree on a new speaker of the parliament and therefore they could not vote for a new government. After more than fifty attempts, Dimal Basha achieved the confidence of the MPs. 

At the end of October, Albin Kurti’s proposal for the new government failed, receiving only 56 votes out of 61 needed. President of Kosovo, Vjosa Osmani, stepped into this complicated situation and appointed another nominee of Vetevendosje, Glauk Konjufca, to form the government. “Vetevendosje and Glauk Konjufca, with whom I just concluded a meeting, have full confidence that they can reach the required number of votes. It is their task to secure those votes, while my duty is to be convinced that they have a realistic chance — and they have convinced me, as required by the Constitutional Court’s ruling,“ said the President.

According to the Constitution, Konjufca has now 15 days to present his government before the parliament. Konjufca’s attempt may not end with victory. In regards to the previous statements of opposition, they do not agree with appointing another Vetevendosje nominee. “Any attempt to give the mandate to this party again would constitute a waste of time, unnecessary delay and deepen the lack of trust in institutions … Currently, the only fair and democratic solution is new snap elections which … will give legitimacy to new institutions,“ says the announcement of the Democratic Party of Kosovo.



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Serbia
A new phase in EU–Serbia relations

The European Commission’s 2025 Enlargement Package and its latest Progress Report on Serbia indicate a noticeable shift in the EU’s approach. Enlargement remains a strategic priority, but the tone toward Serbia has become more direct and less optimistic. Brussels is now placing stronger emphasis on democratic standards, signalling that Serbia’s path to membership depends on more than ticking technical boxes. According to the Enlargement Package, EU accession is within reach only for countries that can demonstrate real reforms. For Serbia, this means that issues such as media freedom, judicial independence and alignment with EU foreign and security policy are now viewed as essential conditions. The Progress Report reinforces this message by pointing to rising political polarisation, weakened trust in institutions, pressure on civil society and limited progress on freedom of expression. Serbia has made only minimal overall advancement, highlighting the gap between political commitments and actual implementation.

This change in tone matters because the EU’s credibility depends on applying its conditions consistently. It also reflects broader geopolitical concerns in the Western Balkans and the need for future Member States to align with EU values and foreign-policy priorities. Domestic developments in Serbia from protests to governance controversies have further increased scrutiny from Brussels. However, the shift has its limits. Much of the EU’s assessment still relies on Serbia’s reform plans rather than measurable results. Political will in Belgrade remains uneven, and the EU’s enforcement tools are relatively weak. Without stronger conditionality, the new narrative risks remaining largely symbolic.

Looking ahead, the EU will need to connect its tougher rhetoric with clearer consequences, including the possibility of adjusting pre-accession funding. Support for civil society and a stronger focus on rule of law and foreign-policy alignment should be central to this strategy. Serbia, in turn, must demonstrate genuine progress on the ground. Trust both domestic and European will depend on credible reforms in media freedom, judicial independence and institutional accountability, as well as clearer alignment with EU foreign-policy positions.

The EU’s 2025 approach could become a turning point, but only if it translates into concrete action. Serbia now faces a strategic choice – commit to substantial reforms or risk remaining stuck behind stronger words and limited results. The success of this new phase in EU–Serbia relations will be judged by implementation, not rhetoric.



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North Macedonia
Municipal elections in North Macedonia 

On 2nd  November, the second round of municipal elections took place in North Macedonia. The ruling centre-right party VMRO-DPMNE, led by Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski, emerged victorious. Following both rounds, the party will govern 54 out of 81 municipalities, including the capital, Skopje, thus further confirming its political dominance.  

VMRO-DPMNE, which stands for the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, celebrated its victory in the town of Kičevo. During the celebrations, Mickoski  declared his intentions that the party´s main goal would be hard and diligent work. Apart from this, the Prime Minister called for unity around the party´s policies. 

The main opposition party, SDSM (the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) suffered losses, winning only six mayoral seats compared to sixteen in the 2021 elections. In response, Vice President Ana Cupeska resigned, while on the other hand the party leader, Venko Filipče, remained defiant and insisted that he would not step down, holding his head high despite the defeat.

The junior ruling party, Vlen („It´s Worth It“), one of the ethnic Albanian parties, performed strongly, gaining nine mayoral seats and reducing the DUI´s (Democratic Union for Integration) dominance, as it now only holds four municipalities. This suggest a shift within the Albanian political bloc, with voters increasingly supporting newer forces. 

Although the left-wing Levica party failed to win any mayoral seats, it showed growing support in Skopje, indicating an increasing urban appeal, likely at the expense of the SDSM.



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