Strategic Analysis Balkan Brief

Review of February 2026

Petra Bošková, Henrieta Vengrínová, Anna Gúliková, Igor Píš, Nikol Privitšová, Terézia Hlačinová

Photo: Shutterstock.com

Albania
The Moliva Scandal: 20 People Arrested in Major Albanian Toxic Waste Trafficking Probe

After over a year, twenty people were arrested after the prosecutor’s office in the port city of Durrës launched an investigation following the seizure of cargo from the vessel Moliva, which contained over 100 containers of suspected hazardous industrial waste. This 2024 scandal, which shook the Albanian political scene, exposed an extensive network of illegal toxic waste trafficking.

On July 4, 2024, 102 containers left the Albanian port of Durrës aboard ships chartered by Maersk, falsely declared as iron oxide. The destination was Thailand. However, based on a tip from a whistleblower, the organisation Basel Action Network (BAN) alerted Thai authorities that the cargo actually consisted of 2,100 tons of hazardous electric arc furnace dust (EAFD). This material is a byproduct of steel scrap recycling and contains dangerous concentrations of heavy metals.

Following the alert from Thai authorities, the cargo was seized and subsequently transferred to the Turkish-flagged vessel Moliva. The case drew international attention and raised questions regarding the oversight of transboundary movements of hazardous waste, the liability of intermediary companies, and compliance with the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes.

Albanian authorities subsequently launched a large-scale investigation, leading to the detention of several suspects and an inquiry into the potential involvement of public officials. Arrest warrants were issued for 33 suspects from customs offices, private companies, port employees, and environmental inspectors. Out of the 33 suspects, 20 have already been arrested, while the remaining 13 are still awaiting their legal proceedings. The suspects include German and Turkish nationals.

However, it appears that the Moliva case was just the tip of the iceberg, as the illegal transport of toxic materials from Albania continues. The latest revelations point to the Italian port of Ancona, where authorities seized another suspicious shipment originating from Albania. This development suggests that Italy is also deeply involved in the illegal business, likely serving as a key transit point within the European waste trafficking network.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Western Balkans as a New Corridor for Chinese Migrants into the EU

An investigation by Balkan Insight published on February 13, 2026, reports that the Western Balkan corridor has become an increasingly used entry point for Chinese nationals trying to reach the European Union, after routes to the United States became uncertain. The pattern describes visa-free access to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, followed by attempts to cross into EU territory with the help of smugglers, most commonly through Croatia. Frontex, the EU border agency, recorded illegal crossings by Chinese nationals on the Western Balkan route rising from 88 in 2022 to more than 620 in 2024, and reaching 706 in 2025.

Chinese nationals mostly leave their homeland due to a combination of economic strain and dissatisfaction. There is persistent youth unemployment (including 18.9% for ages 16–24 last August and a 2023 peak of 21.3%), heightened by the Covid pandemic, and young interviewees describe exhausting work, late wages, and limited prospects for obtaining secure jobs to support their families. Moreover, shifting global mobility rules are pushing the Chinese toward Europe. After Ecuador ended visa-free entry for Chinese citizens in July 2024 and US enforcement tightened, particularly under Donald Trump, Europe became a “Plan B” marketed by smugglers and amplified by social media narratives about welfare support in states like Germany.

On the ground, the report describes a system that is both accessible and risky. Chinese nationals can legally enter Serbia, rent private accommodation, and remain officially invisible, thereby reducing their vulnerability to exploitation. It places the city of Bihać at the centre of BIH’s crossing attempts, describing smuggling adverts appearing in Chinese and migrants making repeated night crossings, facing pushbacks, pepper spray and phone destruction, and paying fees of around 2,000 EUR for guides. Germany is a big draw because asylum seekers can get accommodation, food, health coverage, integration courses and around €400 a month. Despite that, the rejection rates for Chinese asylum claims are high, and the wait times are long. That leaves many resorting to grey-market work, relocating to other countries, or returning home.

Two later incidents from 2025 show how quickly these routes can turn fatal. In October 2025, a boat overturned on the Danube between Plavna and Sotin during a suspected illegal crossing. Nine people were rescued, and one Chinese citizen drowned. Prosecutors in Novi Sad treated the case as suspected people-smuggling. In December 2025, another boat capsized on the Sava near Slavonski Brod, killing three while eight survived. Unofficial reports said the group was mainly Chinese. Ultimately, the reporting suggests that as mobility routes shift and enforcement tightens elsewhere, the Western Balkans are becoming an easier route to Schengen. However, it is one that often depends on smugglers and often ends in legal uncertainty or even tragedy.

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Photo: Shutterstock.com

Montenegro
Montenegro Expands Strategic Highway: Chinese Consortium to Build Second Section

Montenegro’s state road company, Monteput, has officially selected the PowerChina Ltd.–STECOL–PCCD consortium to design and construct the second section of the Bar–Boljare highway. The contract for the Mateševo–Andrijevica stretch is valued at 693,96 EUR. This project is a critical step in completing the 165-kilometre highway intended to link the Adriatic port of Bar with the Serbian border.

The first phase of the highway was financed primarily through Chinese loans and faced criticism for its high cost, but this second section utilises a more diversified financing structure. The project is supported by a 200 million EUR loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and a 150 million EUR grant from the EU. The remaining funds will be provided directly from Montenegro’s state budget.

The contractor was chosen through an international tender conducted under EBRD standards. PowerChina’s bid was the most competitive among the three qualifying finalists, which also included the Cengiz–Azvirt consortium and China Communications Construction Company Limited. The consortium has five years to complete the main design and construction, followed by a two-year defect liability period. Preparatory works and construction are expected to begin in late April 2026.

Beyond improving regional connectivity, the new section is expected to provide a major economic boost to Montenegro’s underdeveloped northern region. This new phase is seen as a strategic priority to finally connect urban and business centres more effectively.

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Kosovo
Kosovo Court Confirms Prison Term for Former Intelligence Chief Over 2018 Deportations

On February 24, a court in Kosovo reaffirmed the prison sentence of former intelligence agency director Driton Gashi for his involvement in the controversial deportation of six Turkish nationals in 2018. Gashi was sentenced to four years and eight months in prison for exceeding his authority during the operation.

The case relates to the arrest and rapid transfer of six Turkish citizens from Kosovo to Turkey. Prosecutors argued that the operation was carried out in violation of legal procedures and without proper institutional authorisation. The court concluded that Gashi abused his official position and acted beyond the scope of his legal powers.

In addition to the prison term, the ruling bars Gashi from holding public office for four years following the completion of his sentence.

The verdict follows a retrial ordered after an earlier judgment was overturned on appeal. After reviewing the case again, the court upheld the conviction. Gashi retains the right to file a further appeal.

The 2018 deportations sparked widespread criticism at the time, both domestically and internationally. Human rights groups warned that the individuals sent back to Turkey, followers of the Turkish opposition cleric Fethullah Gülen, could face mistreatment upon their forced return to Turkey. The episode also triggered political repercussions within Kosovo’s Government.

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Photo: Shutterstock.com

Serbia
Protests in the Country Continue Suggesting that People Want Change in the System

Aleksandr Vucic has been serving as the Serbian President for almost a decade, however it seems that instead of him serving his people and the system in Serbia, both have been (un)knowingly serving him for this time period. But for the past 15 months, waves of protests have been flowing through the country, questioning his position within Serbia’s governing structures. What started as a resistance against corruption after the train station construction in Novi Sad collapsed, killing 16, soon developed into opposition protests against President Vucic. The student-led movement has become much stronger, universities were closed, and hundreds of thousands joined the students to show their support in the matter.

Serbia’s police have taken quite many into custody over the course of the protesting period, following them home after rallies and chasing them around the streets, universities and dormitories. Although the waves of violence are supposed to suppress the protests, they are causing even more demonstrations. There are alleged reports of groups of hooded men rushing into the crowd of protesters and assaulting them during the second half of February, and it was not the first time that such allegations came to light. President Vucic has also appeared on the pro-government national television, justifying the attack, stating that the demonstrators in fact assaulted the supporters of the Government first.

Reports of allegations of violence and physical confrontations have caused the Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office to launch a probe to investigate the alleged attacks at the protest last week in Novi Sad. Police are meant to identify anyone who might be connected to these attacks against protestors, who were at the time demonstrating at the event, which marked the 200th anniversary of Serbia’s institution of Matica Srpska. This occasion was also attended by the ruling party’s representatives and the Government. However, if the attacks were somehow tied to the current regime and the police, it would not be in the best interest of the officers working the case to actually pinpoint the people responsible. Even though the chances are that an obstruction of justice may happen, the Prosecutor’s Office is demanding that the police take legally requested measures and acts to secure evidence, so that those responsible can face justice.

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North Macedonia
Political Polarisation and Policy Challenges in North Macedonia

In February 2026, North Macedonia experienced a clear division between its successful foreign diplomacy and its troubled domestic reforms. While the Government made significant progress in strengthening international ties, internal developments continued to be defined by political polarisation and weak institutional credibility. This dual dynamic highlights a country that is moving forward on the global stage while remaining anchored by persistent rule-of-law challenges at home. The domestic political scene was dominated by the arrest of former First Deputy Prime Minister Artan Grubi, who had been a fugitive for over a year. The judiciary’s decision to place him under house arrest rather than in full custody sparked widespread public anger, fueling the perception that the legal system provides “selective justice” for the elite. This controversy, alongside the revival of older corruption scandals, has deepened the divide between major political parties. Instead of fostering accountability, these legal actions are often viewed as tools for partisan confrontation, further damaging the public’s trust in independent institutions.

These internal struggles are reflected in broader regional assessments, which show a stagnation in anti-corruption efforts across the Western Balkans. For North Macedonia, this lack of progress remains the most significant barrier to its EU accession goals. Security concerns also shifted into the political spotlight following record-breaking seizures of illegal marijuana. While the police action addressed cross-border criminal networks, the event quickly devolved into a domestic political dispute, with parties using the seizures to blame one another for organised crime. Despite these governance deficits, North Macedonia’s foreign policy remained a bright spot. The establishment of a new trade framework with the United States marked a high point in the country’s economic diplomacy. This agreement not only strengthens transatlantic ties but also advances critical goals like energy diversification. Ultimately, February 2026 showed that while North Macedonia is successfully aligning itself with Western strategic interests, its long-term stability and democratic consolidation still depend on solving the deep-rooted issues of corruption and judicial fragility.

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