Strategic Analysis Balkan Brief

Review of August 2026

Petra Bošková, Ema Valachová, Dominika Dragúňová, Lea Bellušová, Terézia Hlačinová, Igor Píš, Ján Jakub Kolár



 

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Albania
Controversial Italy-Albania Migrant Deal Sparks Severe Human Rights Reactions

A new Amnesty International report has heavily criticised the bilateral migration pact between Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. The arrangement established offshore detention facilities in Shengjin and Gjader for processing asylum seekers under Italian jurisdiction. However, the scheme has sparked intense controversy. Critics now accuse both governments of violating human rights, bypassing democratic oversight and misusing public funds.

The original plan was designed to fast-track asylum claims for men from designated safe countries within 28 days. Nonetheless, after Italian courts blocked initial transfers based on a ruling by the EU Court of Justice, Rome changed the centre’s focus to detaining rejected applicants awaiting deportation.

Despite these adjustments, human rights organisations and investigative journalists have highlighted systematic failures throughout the operation. In its report, Amnesty International documented concerns within the Gjader facility, recording dozens of critical incidents over five weeks (including suicide attempts, severe self-harm and violent protests). Legal experts also argue that the offshore model deliberately cuts detainees off from effective judicial remedies. The geographic isolation of the facility in Albania restricts access to lawyers, independent observers and standard court oversight, leaving operations largely hidden from the public.

At the same time, the arrangement has faced strong criticism regarding governance. An investigation by BIRN revealed that construction costs doubled to over 74 million EUR through non-competitive direct negotiations, increasing the average cost per bed to almost 72 thousand EUR.

Although both countries label the agreement as an innovative measure to deter irregular migration, legal analysts argue that it sets a dangerous precedent for outsourcing border control. By ignoring ordinary legislative debate and institutional safeguards, access to asylum is restricted, and Albania’s governance standards on its path towards EU integration are threatened.

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Bosnia and Herzegovina
Between Political Continuity and a New Post-Dodik Era

Bosnia and Herzegovina is entering the final phase before the general elections scheduled for October 4 2026, amid persistent political fragmentation, unresolved institutional tensions and growing uncertainty over the country’s Euro-Atlantic trajectory. Rather than representing a decisive break with the post-Dayton political order, the upcoming elections are increasingly becoming a test of whether Bosnia and Herzegovina can move beyond its established cycle of ethnic politics and institutional obstruction.

The most significant development remains the transformation of Republika Srpska’s political landscape following the removal of Milorad Dodik from the entity’s presidency. Although Dodik can no longer formally hold the office, his political influence remains substantial. The October elections will therefore serve as an important indicator of whether the SNSD can maintain its dominance without Dodik occupying the centre of institutional power. At the same time, opposition parties in Republika Srpska are attempting to consolidate their position and challenge the long-standing SNSD political structure.

The domestic political situation is further complicated by uncertainty surrounding the future of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Christian Schmidt’s decision to leave the post amid intense pressure to step down has intensified debate over the role of international oversight in BIH. Disagreement between the United States and European actors over the future leadership of the OHR risks weakening the credibility of an institution that remains central to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Meanwhile, BIH’s European perspective remains stalled. Despite candidate status and the EU’s commitment to enlargement, political divisions continue to obstruct the reforms required to advance the accession process. The contrast with faster-moving candidates such as Montenegro and Albania increasingly highlights BIH’s structural inability to translate political declarations into institutional progress.

The death of former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladić on August 27 has further demonstrated the unresolved legacy of the 1992–1995 war. His death triggered sharply contrasting reactions across BIH and the wider region, illustrating that historical narratives and wartime identities remain deeply embedded in contemporary politics.

The October elections are unlikely to fundamentally transform BIH’s political system overnight. Their greater significance lies in determining whether a post-Dodik political configuration can emerge and whether international actors can maintain sufficient leverage to prevent further institutional erosion.

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Montenegro
From Front-runner to Test Case for Enlargement

Montenegro is entering a decisive phase of its European integration process. The unanimous adoption of constitutional amendments on August 24 has strengthened the government’s claim that the country can complete EU accession negotiations by the end of 2026. More importantly, it signals an unusually broad domestic consensus around the strategic objective of EU membership.

Brussels is increasingly treating Montenegro not simply as another candidate, but as a potential model for a more credible enlargement policy. According to European Western Balkans, EU member states are considering an accelerated roadmap to close the remaining negotiating chapters by the end of 2026, while preparing the first draft of an Accession Treaty as early as September. The parallel preparation of the treaty suggests that enlargement is moving from political signalling towards concrete institutional planning.

Yet the acceleration also exposes vulnerabilities. Reports of growing hybrid influence from the region, as well as unresolved bilateral questions with Croatia, underline that Montenegro’s accession remains politically contestable. The country’s integration into the European People’s Party through Europe Now! further reinforces its political anchoring within the EU mainstream, but observer status is not a substitute for reform.

Montenegro therefore faces a dual test: whether it can maintain reform momentum, and whether the EU can deliver on enlargement when geopolitical pressure is rising. Success could make Podgorica the clearest proof that enlargement still works.

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Kosovo
Vetëvendosje and Opposition Parties Back Law Professor for Presidency

It seems that after months of political deadlock, Kosovo is walking down the path of appointing a new President. The ruling party Vetëvendosje, together with the opposition party Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), agreed on a joint candidate.

Political elites have chosen Professor Doctor Bekim Sejdiu, former advisor to the previous President Vjosa Osmani. Sejdiu is a former judge of the Kosovo Constitutional Court, and since 2002 he has been lecturing in law at the University of Pristina. Apart from that, he served as an ambassador to Turkey from 2008 to 2012, and as Kosovo’s consul general in New York from 2012 to 2014.

“The talks were not easy, but they were exhaustive; we held long meetings and engaged in continuous, quite intense discussions. Both sides were committed to finding a consensus candidate for the President of Kosovo,” LDK leader Lumir Abdixhiku told the media at a joint press conference with acting Prime Minister Albin Kurti and MPs from the LDK and Vetëvendosje.

The President is chosen by secret vote in parliament. The first two rounds demand a two-thirds majority (80 votes), but if no candidate reaches that threshold, the third round only requires an absolute majority of 61 votes.

The election has yet to take place since the parliament has not been officially inaugurated. The process was halted due to ongoing disagreements over the candidate for the future President. Vetëvendosje refused to name the Speaker of the parliament too, arguing that the matter of the next head of state needs to be resolved first.

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Serbia
Fighting Fire with East and West: Serbia’s Strategic Balancing and Geopolitical Importance on Display

August’s severe wildfires offered an unusually tangible illustration of Serbia’s foreign-policy balancing act and of the country’s sustained geopolitical importance to both Russia and the European Union (EU). Faced with fires across the country, including a major blaze in the Deliblato Sands Special Nature Reserve, where more than 3,500 hectares were affected, Belgrade sought assistance from both Moscow and Brussels. What began as an emergency response consequently became a revealing example of Serbia’s ability to maintain practical cooperation with competing geopolitical partners. Both responded to Belgrade’s appeal without any publicly disclosed political conditions attached to their assistance, and by August 26, Russian and EU-supported crews ultimately found themselves fighting the same fires simultaneously.

Russian assistance, however, arrived first. On August 19, Moscow signalled its readiness to aid what it described as the brotherly Serbian people, followed by the deployment of an Ilyushin Il-76 firefighting aircraft from Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations to Niš. The aircraft, capable of carrying 42 tonnes of water, had by August 25 completed around two dozen sorties and dropped 924 tonnes of water over affected areas. Apart from its deployment naturally opposing Russia’s wider political isolation from Europe; noteworthily, the Il-76 reached Serbia through Bulgarian airspace, ordinarily closed to Russian aircraft subject to long-standing EU sanctions, under a humanitarian exemption. As such, this episode demonstrated that humanitarian necessity can temporarily cut across otherwise rigid geopolitical divisions and, hypothetically, that the EU sanctions regime may prove more flexible and relaxed when Serbia’s immediate interests are at stake.

Interestingly, Belgrade had initially justified resorting to Moscow for assistance on operational grounds, arguing that no aircraft with comparable firefighting capacity was immediately available through European mechanisms. Brussels was quick to react, stressing that Serbia had not formally activated the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. On August 21, Serbia did so, and within hours the EU promptly mobilised four rescEU helicopters based in Czechia, Romania and Slovakia, alongside ground firefighting teams from Germany and Romania.

The speed and visibility of both responses can hardly be separated entirely from Serbia’s geopolitical importance. Humanitarian necessity was the immediate motivation, but the assistance also allowed both actors to demonstrate the value of their relationship with Belgrade. For Moscow, the Il-76 reinforced the image of Russia as a dependable traditional partner at a time when its influence in Europe has narrowed considerably. For Brussels, the rapid mobilisation of European resources demonstrated that Serbia’s relationship with the EU produces tangible benefits beyond the often-abstract language of accession negotiations.

Recent developments therefore contained an implicit element of strategic competition. Neither Russia nor the EU benefits from allowing the other to monopolise the image of being Serbia’s indispensable partner. Serbia, in turn, derives leverage with considerable associated benefits from precisely this ambiguity, drawing upon both relationships without being forced to choose exclusively between them. The wildfires thus materialised Serbia’s familiar balancing act between East and West from diplomatic rhetoric into a tangible reality.

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North Macedonia
North Macedonia and Serbia Set to Build Strategic Gas Interconnector

In a significant step for Balkan energy integration, North Macedonia and Serbia have officially signed a key agreement to build a natural gas interconnector pipeline. The contract for the design and construction of the Macedonian section was signed in Skopje by state-owned gas operator Nomagas and the construction company Rapid Build. The project, estimated at 29.4 million EUR, is scheduled for completion by the fourth quarter of 2028.

The Macedonian segment of the pipeline will stretch 22.4 kilometres. It will run from the village of Klečevce in the Kumanovo municipality to Sopot on the Serbian border. Built with a 500-millimetre diameter, the pipeline will have an annual capacity of 1.5 billion cubic meters, featuring bidirectional operability to ensure flexible energy flows in both directions.

This infrastructure has major strategic importance. Currently, North Macedonia depends on a single entry point at the Bulgarian border to import Russian natural gas. The new interconnector will integrate both countries into the European Union’s “Vertical Corridor” initiative, which stretches from Greece up to Central Europe. By linking with a separate gas pipeline between North Macedonia and Greece, expected to open in 2027, the region will gain direct access to liquefied natural gas from the Alexandroupolis terminal in Greece.

This dual connectivity allows North Macedonia to transition from a simple consumer into a critical transit hub, moving non-Russian gas from Greece to Serbia, Hungary, and Austria. Heavily supported by EU grants and loans, the pipeline represents a vital step toward diversifying the energy supply of the Western Balkans and boosting overall regional security.

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