The actions of Armenian authorities against church officials have drawn criticism both at home and abroad

On October 3, Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan was sentenced to two years in prison under the Criminal Code for “making public calls aimed at seizing power, violating territorial integrity, or overthrowing the constitutional order, using publicly displayed works, mass media, or information and communication technologies.” The charge is based on an interview he gave more than a year ago, in which the cleric spoke about the “need for a coup.” At that time, however, the Prosecutor General’s Office had reviewed the same statements and found no grounds for criminal proceedings. The prosecution now justifies opening the case by claiming that Ajapahyan repeated the same statement in June 2025.

Human rights defender Zaruhi Hovhannisyan refuted this reasoning in an interview with Medialab, saying: “From a legal standpoint, it is impossible for the same act to be considered non-criminal in one case and criminal in another. A person cannot now be sentenced to imprisonment for an action that was previously not regarded as a crime.”

Similarly, Anna Melikyan, legal expert at the Protection of Rights Without Borders NGO, in written comments to Democracy Watch, pointed to serious legal shortcomings in the case. She noted that although the Archbishop was charged for repeated calls made over a protracted timeline, the Prosecutor’s Office failed to demonstrate that those calls posed any real risk of violence or that any harmful actions followed them. According to Melikyan, this absence of demonstrable harm undermines the case’s legal foundation.

Notably, even some members of Armenia’s civil society, who are generally sympathetic to the government, have expressed concern about the disproportionate nature of the ruling, according to civilnet.org. On October 15, Armenian authorities arrested another 10 priests and a bishop in the country’s central Aragatsotn region. Among those detained is Bishop Mkrtich Proshyan, the head of Aragatsotn diocese and the cousin of the Armenian Catholicos, Garegin Nersisyan.

According to the Investigative Committee, a public criminal prosecution has been launched against Bishop Proshyan under Article 149, Part 2, Clause 4 of the Criminal Code (obstructing the exercise of electoral rights through the abuse of official position) and Article 236, Part 3 (using official authority or influence to prevent or compel participation in a gathering, or to offer material incentives to influence participation). The charges stem from allegations that Bishop Proshyan abused his position to interfere in electoral and public assembly processes.

On the following day, an Armenian lawyer, Aleksandr Kochubayev, was detained by masked officers of the National Security Service (NSS). Earlier that day, Kochubayev published an angry post on Facebook condemning the officials who oversaw the arrest of Bishop Mkrtich Proshyan and another priest on October 15. In the post, he accused investigators, prosecutors, and judges of acting on political orders amid Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s ongoing confrontation with the Armenian Apostolic Church. He referred to them as “sons of a bitch” who had “sold their souls to the devil”, reported the OC Media.

Kochubayev was charged with making “defamatory” statements harmful to the officials’ ”rights and legitimate interests” and was remanded in pre-trial detention overnight by a Yerevan court judge, Masis Melkonyan, known for authorising the arrests of government critics.

Kochubaev’s arrest was later condemned by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). “The detention of a lawyer apparently for statements solely related to his professional work is a serious interference with the independence of the legal profession,” said Temur Shakirov, ICJ Director for Europe and Central Asia. “Lawyers must be able to defend their clients and speak about the administration of justice without intimidation or fear of punishment.” The ICJ called on the Armenian authorities to ensure Alexander Kochubaev’s immediate release and for an end to the use of criminal law to penalise lawyers solely for the exercise of their professional duties.

Sources:

•  Civilnet.org, “Archbishop Ajapahyan’s conviction and the politicisation of justice in Armenia”, https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/978379/archbishop-ajapahyans-conviction-and-the-politicization-of-justice-in-armenia/
• OC Media, „Armenian authorities crack down on the church, again”, https://oc-media.org/armenian-authorities-crack-down-on-the-church-again/
• GHAZANCHYAN Siranush, Public Radio of Armenia, https://en.armradio.am/2025/10/16/aragatsotn-diocese-leader-bishop-mkrtich-proshyan-arrested-for-two-months/
• OC Media, „Armenian lawyer arrested after Facebook post criticising authorities”, https://oc-media.org/armenian-lawyer-arrested-after-facebook-post-criticising-authorities/
• ICJ, “Armenia: ICJ condemns detention of defence lawyer Alexander Kochubaev and calls for his immediate release”, https://www.icj.org/armenia-icj-condemns-detention-of-defence-lawyer-alexander-kochubaev-and-calls-for-his-immediate-release/

The “grey cardinal” Ramiz Mehdiyev charged with treason

On October 14, the Sabail District Court of Baku ruled on the criminal case involving Ramiz Mehdiyev, the former Head of the Administration of the President of Azerbaijan. According to information released by the pro-government media, the Court granted the petition against Mehdiyev, who faced charges of committing grave crimes, and imposed a preventive measure of house arrest for four months.

In a significant escalation of the allegations against Ramiz Mehdiyev, a longtime ally of former President Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijani media have claimed that Mehdiyev planned to assassinate President Ilham Aliyev as part of a failed coup plot. Ramiz Mehdiyev served as the Head of the Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan from 1995 to 2019, under both President Heydar Aliyev and his son, Ilham Aliyev. He was often referred to as the “grey cardinal” due to his influential role in Azerbaijani politics. Following his tenure in the presidential administration, he served as the President of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan from 2019 to 2022.

Mehdiyev had notably close relations with Russia, as noted by Caucasus Watch. According to local media reports, he played a pivotal role in facilitating the establishment of Sputnik Azerbaijan, a branch of the Russian state news agency Rossiya Segodnya, in Baku. This move was allegedly made without consulting Azerbaijan’s top leadership, indicating his strong pro-Russian stance. Additionally, he held meetings with high-ranking Russian officials, including Sergey Naryshkin, the head of the Russian Presidential Administration, and Alexander Beglov, his deputy, to discuss governance and administrative practices. Mehdiyev was also awarded Russia’s Order of Honour, highlighting the depth of his connections with Moscow.

According to an article published in Eurasianet.org, the arrest of a longtime Aliyev family lieutenant on treason charges raises fresh questions about Baku’s relationship with Russia, shortly after apparent normalisation.

According to a report published by the government-funded APA news agency on October 16, Mehdiyev approached Russian contacts at some point earlier in 2025, amid the Azerbaijani-Russian chill, with a plan to oust Aliyev, replacing him with a provisional state council that Mehdiyev himself would lead. The Russian leadership was allegedly initially receptive to the plan but ultimately concluded it did not have any chance of success, the report indicated. Ultimately, Putin informed the Azerbaijani leader of the plot during their October tête-à-tête in Dushanbe, according to the article’s author.

Additionally, the official version states that Mehdiyev approached Russian contacts with the idea of the coup. But some longtime Azerbaijan watchers wonder whether it was Moscow that approached Mehdiyev first, and Russian officials later decided to betray him after determining that a coup couldn’t succeed.

Putin’s exposure of the plot to Aliyev is framed in the official account as a friendly move. However, the Kremlin leader’s gesture carried menacing undertones, suggesting that Aliyev’s regime may not be as stable as it appears, and that even the closest of allies can become a turncoat. It may well have been Putin’s way of telling Aliyev; don’t stray too far from Russia, and your regime will be protected, writes Eurasianet.org.

Sources:

•  OSTILLER Nate, OC Media, “Former Azerbaijani ‘grey cardinal’ accused of plotting to kill Aliyev”, https://oc-media.org/former-azerbaijani-gray-cardinal-accused-of-plotting-to-kill-aliyev/
• Caucasus Watch, “Former High-Level Azerbaijani Official Faces Serious Charges Including Treason and Power Seizure”, https://caucasuswatch.de/news/12652
• Eurasianet.org, „Analysis: Mehdiyev arrest points to lingering Azerbaijani-Russian tension”, https://eurasianet.org/analysis-mehdiyev-arrest-points-to-lingering-azerbaijani-russian-tension

Development of relations between Baku and the West in October 2025

On October 16, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, received the credentials of the newly appointed Ambassador of France to Azerbaijan, Sophie Lagoutte, stating that “misunderstandings with France are now in the past”. Recalling his meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron in Copenhagen, President Aliyev emphasised that the issues which had previously caused misunderstandings between the two countries “now belong to the past.” He noted that a new era has begun in the bilateral agenda, stressing in particular the importance of restoring and developing human, business, and cultural ties between Azerbaijan and France.

For her part, Ambassador Lagoutte stated that a new chapter has opened in relations between the two countries and pledged to make every effort to further strengthen them. During the meeting, the sides discussed the successful development of Azerbaijan–France relations in various fields, including high technology and the aerospace sector. The importance of reactivating the Intergovernmental Commission was underscored, along with the role of twin-city partnerships, reciprocal visits by business delegations, and the participation of French companies in various projects.

The tensions in the relations between Azerbaijan and France worsened after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. Aliyev and other officials have frequently accused France of taking a one-sided stance in the conflict in favour of Armenia, and have taken issue with its military support of Armenia. In turn, France has accused Azerbaijan of supporting deadly riots in its overseas territory of New Caledonia in 2024.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom has lifted its arms embargo on Armenia and Azerbaijan, which was introduced in 1992, according to a statement published by Minister of State for Europe and North America Stephen Doughty on October 14. In the statement, Doughty said the decision follows the progress achieved at the August 8 peace summit in Washington. He also announced that the UK government has elevated its relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan to the level of strategic partnership, covering areas such as trade, security, and defence. The new cooperation plan will include annual ministerial meetings. “Given the significant progress made in advancing peace, and the historic outcomes of the recent summit in Washington hosted by President Trump, the UK considers that the rationale underpinning the OSCE’s 1992 recommended arms embargo on ‘all deliveries of weapons and munitions to forces engaged in combat in the Nagorno-Karabakh area’ has fallen away,” Doughty said.

He said the decision aims to support both countries’ efforts to protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity, both against conventional and hybrid threats. Doughty noted that all export licenses for arms sales will nonetheless continue to be reviewed individually under strict criteria.

Sources:

•  Aze.media, “Aliyev says misunderstandings with France are now in the past”, https://aze.media/aliyev-says-misunderstandings-with-france-are-now-in-the-past/

Georgian Dream to ban the three largest opposition parties

Georgia’s ruling party will ask the Constitutional Court to outlaw the three largest opposition parties, which are all strongly pro-Western, a senior member of the ruling Georgian Dream party said on October 28. Shalva Papuashvili said the parties “practically continuously deny both the domestic-political and foreign-political legitimacy of the current government and the ruling political party of Georgia and, accordingly, its constitutionality.” The three parties — Coalition for Change, United National Movement, and the Strong Georgia-Lelo bloc — pose “a real threat to the constitutional order,” Papuashvili said. “Our lawsuit presents evidence that unconstitutional goals drive these political parties,” Papuashvili said.

Georgian Dream’s constitutional lawsuit does not seek to ban the fourth major opposition party, For Georgia, founded in 2021 by former Prime Minister and now opposition leader Giorgi Gakharia. This comes despite the fact that, in the past, the ruling party sometimes included Gakharia’s party among those it aimed to ban.

According to Papuashvili, Gakharia’s party avoided accusations of possible sabotage by recently ending the parliamentary boycott it had joined a year ago alongside other opposition parties. All 12 of For Georgia’s MPs entered Parliament, just a few hours before Papuashvili’s briefing, after the party stated that its boycott decision had been a mistake.

Papuasvili further added that the lawsuit will not concern the parties’ mandates in the municipal councils. Accordingly, Lelo members will retain the mandates they won in the 2025 municipal vote, which the UNM, Akhali, and several other opposition groups boycotted.

This includes Strategy Aghmashenebeli and European Georgia, which formed an alliance with the UNM ahead of the 2024 elections, as well as Girchi – More Freedom and Droa, which allied with Akhali. Papushvili stated that, at present, these parties do not have significant influence, including a realistic prospect of overcoming the electoral threshold, and therefore, “there is no necessity to ban them”. However, he issued a warning that the question of their constitutionality could be revisited later if they gain substantial influence over the political process.

Additionally, on October 16, the Georgian Dream parliament has approved, in its final reading, a legislative package that would strip individuals “associated” with parties declared unconstitutional of their passive voting rights, including the right to found or join political parties, run in elections, or hold public office. Under the amendments to Article 23 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of Georgia, which provides for the annulment of a party’s registration if its establishment or activities are declared unconstitutional by the Court, the restrictions will now extend to “individuals associated with this political party.” Such individuals will be prohibited from founding, leading, or joining a political party; serving in its executive or supervisory bodies; holding state, political, or other public office; or assuming leadership positions in constitutional bodies.

The Georgian government’s actions in question have sparked a wave of criticism in the West. The co-rapporteurs of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) for Georgia, Edite Estrela and Sabina Cudic, warned that banning opposition parties could create a one-party system incompatible with Council of Europe membership. They urged the ruling party to reconsider the lawsuit and announced plans for a fact-finding visit before the end of the year.

Meanwhile, the ALDE party in its statement wrote that it is “deeply concerned and condemns the initiative of the Georgian Dream party that it will ask the Constitutional Court to ban opposition parties, including Lelo – Strong Georgia, a member of the ALDE Party”.

Sources:

• RFE/RL, “Georgian Dream Demands Ban On Three Largest Opposition Parties”, https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-opposition-parties-papuashvili-ban-constitutional-court/33573960.html

• GVADZABIA Mikheil, OC Media, „Georgian Dream names the three major opposition parties it seeks to ban”, https://oc-media.org/georgian-dream-names-the-three-major-opposition-parties-it-seeks-to-ban/

• Civil.ge, „GD Parliament Adopts Law Extending Party Ban to Individuals”, https://civil.ge/archives/706643

• Georgia Today, „Georgian Dream Moves to Ban Major Opposition Parties, Sparking Fears of One-Party Rule”, https://georgiatoday.ge/georgian-dream-moves-to-ban-major-opposition-parties-sparking-fears-of-one-party-rule/

• Aldeparty.eu, “ALDE Party Statement on the Banning of Opposition Parties in Georgia”, https://www.aldeparty.eu/blog/news-11/alde-party-statement-on-the-banning-of-opposition-parties-in-georgia-341