Erdoğan’s Mediation Initiatives in the Russia–Ukraine Conflict

Former Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Davutoğlu, driven by a vision of Türkey’s strategic autonomy, presented the country as an ideal mediator due to its unique „intermediate position“. In the UN, the OSCE and the OIC, Türkey co-chairs Friends of Mediation groups, hosts the Istanbul Mediation Conferences, and operates the „Mediation for Peace“ Certificate Programme for diplomats. Continues to strengthen this role, as evidenced also by the establishment of a dedicated Directorate General for International Mediation in April 2024. In the case of the Balkans and Africa, mediation initiatives and engagement through TIKA, Diyanet or the Yunus Emre Institute can be seen primarily as an instrument of Turkish soft power; in the case of the conflict in Ukraine, the motivations for Türkey are different. The war has threatened Türkey’s national interests by taking place in the Black Sea, over which it maintains control, and also by testing the balance between important partners, including NATO commitments. However,  Erdoğan also sees it as an opportunity to „succeed“ if Türkey contributes to ending the conflict, in the long term it would strengthen its international status and at the same time demonstrate its ability to assert its national interests. 

Erdogan’s first efforts were characterised by „ending the conflict“ at an early stage, when the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine and Russia,  Kuleba and Lavrov, met at a side event of a diplomatic forum in Antalya less than a month after the start of the invasion. At the time, Ukraine demanded a 24-hour ceasefire for humanitarian supplies, but the meeting failed to produce a result. The initiative continued in Istanbul, where Ukraine submitted the so-called ten-point „Istanbul communiqué“, which contained conditions on its side. However, Russia broke off the negotiations the very next day, explicitly disagreeing with the Crimean issue, and the parties were ultimately unable to agree on the status of Donbas and Luhansk and the nature of security guarantees, which, together with the atmosphere of the Bucha massacre, swept the initiative off the table. 

After the failures in Antalya and Istanbul, Türkey has focused on „partial agreements“ or addressing specific humanitarian issues. In response to Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian Black Sea ports, which threatened to disrupt the world’s food supply, including to developing countries, Erdoğan’s Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), overseen by representatives of Türkey, Ukraine, Russia and the UN through the Joint Coordination Center (JCC) in Istanbul, reflected an affirmation of his mediation efforts, however also became a fragile agreement. It was repeatedly extended, with Putin reluctant to conclude it from the start, and finally expired in July 2023. Russia announced its refusal to extend it further, citing obstacles related to Western sanctions and unfulfilled conditions to facilitate the export of its own agricultural products and fertilisers as reasons for its decision. Türkey also brokered two prisoner exchanges, in 2022 in cooperation with Saudi Arabia, in which Ukraine got back more than 200 of its citizens, including commanders who led the defense of Mariupol, as well as foreigners fighting for Ukraine, some of whom were sentenced to death, while Russia and pro-Russian forces received 55 people and Ukrainian politician Viktor Medvedchuk in exchange. Later in 2024, it engaged in what was billed as the largest prisoner swap between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War at Ankara’s Esenboğa airport. 

The „foreshadowing“ of Türkey’s next possible role in resolving the conflict was Donald Trump’s return to the White House. Erdoğan has often referred to Trump as his friend, despite being excluded from the F-35 program and facing CAAT sanctions by the US for receiving the Russian S-400 missile system. He also sympathised with Trump’s ’24-hour solution‘ campaign promise for the conflict. Initially, Trump predictably threw himself into active negotiations with Putin with a vision of ending this conflict, but a reality check came quickly. Russia is not interested in a compromise that looks like a concession, and Ukraine is unwilling to accept „peace“ at the cost of territorial losses. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s statement in April 2025 that the U.S. would give up its role as mediator if it did not see progress, after more than 100 days of direct confrontation, automatically created considerations of bringing in another party. For Trump, who has suggested that a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia „may be impossible,“ Erdoğan has become a logical step – he is able to maintain direct communication with both Zelenskyy and Putin, already has experience mediating the conflict, and has repeatedly expressed „enthusiasm“ for another peace initiative, whether during the London summit or Zelenskyy’s visit to Istanbul this year. In his last phone call in early May 2025, Trump invited Erdoğan to visit Washington, explicitly expressing cooperation in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Even if Trump has not achieved a complete end to the war, a minor advance or partial agreement with Erdoğan’s help may be sold by Trump as a success of his efforts.

Conclusion

Türkiye’s foreign policy has lacked consistency. However, since Erdoğan’s leadership began, he has emphasised strategic autonomy, often distancing himself from pro-Western policies when it serves Türkiye’s interests. To avoid jeopardising its interests in conflicts where it is not directly involved, Türkiye continues to balance its actions. It supports Ukraine with military and humanitarian aid, rejects sanctions against Russia, and strengthens trade relations with Moscow when beneficial. Türkiye can be assigned three roles, which undoubtedly reflect the nature of its approach to the conflict: a partner, a mediator and a strategic balancer. It manages multilateral relations with a determination to pursue its interests even when they begin to exceed the Alliance’s commitments. The position of mediator, which Erdoğan has actively cultivated and in which he has already achieved results, will now have a chance to make a comeback as American foreign policy evolves. Türkiye does not have the leverage to force Moscow or Kyiv to make major concessions on issues of sovereignty or territorial integrity, but it does have a chance to be competent to broker partial agreements; the potential shift from Trump-Putin cooperation to Trump-Erdoğan cooperation may thus have an impact.

Vanesa Opšenáková is an Intern at the Strategic Analysis Young Leaders Programme

Disclaimer: Views presented here are those of the author solely and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Strategic Analysis